The Rule Change

The effort for Federal recognition of Native Hawaiians for the purposes of creating a governing entity went through three stages, or attempts: The Akaka Bill, direct recognition by the Department of Interior and the rule change.

Dept. of Interior (DOI) Hearings:

https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/interior-considers-procedures-to-reestablish-a-government-to-government-relationship-with-the-native-hawaiian-community

In this latest (and what seems to be the most successful) attempt DOI looked to reestablish government-to-government relationship between Federal government and Native Hawaiian community. On June 18, 2014, the DOI stated,

The Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) is considering whether to propose an administrative rule that would facilitate the reestablishment of a government-to-government relationship with the Native Hawaiian community, to more effectively implement the special political and trust relationship that Congress has established between that community and the United States. The purpose of this advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) is tosolicit public comments on whether and how the Department of the Interior should facilitate the reestablishment of a government-to-government relationship with the Native Hawaiian community. In this ANPRM, the Secretary also announces several public meetings in Hawaii and several consultations with federally recognized tribes in the continental United States to consider these issues.

Secretary of the Interior, Sally Jewell stated “The Department is responding to requests from not only the Native Hawaiian community but also state and local leaders and interested parties who recognize that we need to begin a conversation of diverse voices to help determine the best path forward for honoring the trust relationship that Congress has created specifically to benefit Native Hawaiians.” Public hearings throughout Hawaii, from June 23 to August 8, 2014, which I wrote about in the Nation magazine, asked 5 “Questions to be Answered:”

1. Should the Secretary propose an administrative rule to recreate a government-to-government relationship with the Native Hawaiian community?
2. Should the Secretary assist the Native Hawaiian community in reorganizing its government?
3. What process should be established for drafting and ratifying a reorganized Native Hawaiian government’s constitution or other governing document?
4. Should the Secretary instead rely on reorganization through a process established by the Native Hawaiian community and facilitated by the State of Hawaii, to the extent such a process is consistent with Federal law?
5. If so, what conditions should the Secretary establish as prerequisites to Federal acknowledgment of a government-to-government relationship with the reorganized Native Hawaiian government?

Prof. Williamson Chang

On September 29th, 2015, the DOI released the rule change. UH Law Professor Williamson Chang released the following statement in response:

The Department of Interior issued its long awaited proposed rule as to a Native Hawaiian Governing body. It was not much. The Federal Government is giving very little. If this is the last word on the federal government and Hawaiians, from the point of view of the United States’ the history of Hawaii ends with a “whimper not a bang”
1. It starts by noting that only the written comments counted, not the vehement oral testimony.
2. It is premised on false history: At page 6 of the long document, it states the Republic of Hawaii ceded its lands to the United States and that Congress passed a joint resolution annexing the Hawaiian Islands. Accordingly, all that follows flows from a flawed premise: The United States acquired the Hawaiian Islands and has jurisdiction. Moreover, it claims that the United States has title to the crown and government lands.
3. Even so, it gives very little. It would make a consenting Native Hawaiian government “just like” a tribe, but not a tribe.
4. The law that applies to tribes would not apply to the Hawaiian entity. Congress would have to explicit[ly] write Hawaiians in to Indian programs—just as it is today. No gain.
5. It admits that the purpose of the proposed rule is to protect Hawaiians from constitutional attacks on Hawaiian-only entitlement programs. The Department of the Interior, however, does not control the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court would still be free to strike down Hawaiian only programs if it so desired.
6. The Hawaiian governing entity gets no lands by this proposal
7. The proposal does not affect Federal holdings or title to the Crown and Government lands.
8. There is to be no compensation for past wrongs.
9. The rule limits the Hawaiian government to Hawaiians only.
10. Only one Hawaiian government can establish a relationship with the Federal Government under this proposal.
11. It precludes federal recognition of a restored Kingdom of Hawaii, or Provisional Government that would become a State either as a Kingdom or any other.
12. The Hawaiian Government cannot be in violation of “federal laws” such as the prohibition on ‘titles” in the U.S. Constitution—thus no quasi-Kingdom either.
In summary—and this is from a very brief reading. I may be in error, I may have overlooked various important sections, but in the name of getting this to you as soon as possible. Here is the link to the proposal, its supporting documents and frequently asked questions.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking read:

The U.S. Department of the Interior is proposing to create an administrative procedure and criteria that the Secretary of the Interior would apply if the Native Hawaiian community forms a unified government that then seeks a formal government-to-government relationship with the United States.  Under the proposal, the Native Hawaiian community — not the Federal government — would decide whether to reorganize a Native Hawaiian government, what form that government would take, and whether it would seek a government-to-government relationship with the United States.

The proposal, which takes the form of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), builds on more than 150 Federal statutes that Congress has enacted over the last century to recognize and implement the special political and trust relationship between the United States and the Native Hawaiian community.  The NPRM comes on the heels of a robust and transparent public comment period as part of an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) process that began last year and included public meetings.  More than 5,000 members of the public submitted written comments to the ANPRM, and they overwhelmingly favored creating a pathway for re-establishing a formal government-to-government relationship.

Members of the Hawai’i Congressional delegation predictably responded in favor of the rule change, as did Governor Ige. Rep. Tulsi Gabbard’s statement was perhaps the most substantive:

Many indigenous groups in the U.S. have the right of self-determination, and today’s announcement acknowledges that that right also belongs to the Native Hawaiian people, one of the largest native communities in the country. These rules incorporate over 5,000 public comments submitted to the Department of Interior (DOI), and should they be adopted, the Native Hawaiian community will have the option to re-establish a unified government and self-determine their future relationship with the federal government. I encourage all interested parties to submit their comments to DOI during the 90-day public review period to ensure a collaborative final ruling.

The list of candidates for delegate to the constitutional convention was released by Na’i Aupuni the next day. It can be viewed here, but prominent candidates included John Aeto, Keoni and Louis Aagard, OHA trustee Rowena Akana, former Mayor Dante Carpenter, Prof. Williamson Chang, Jade Danner, Prof. Lilikala Kame’eleihiwa, Senator Brickwood Galleria, Adrian Kamali’i, Sovereignty leader Dennis “Bumpy” Kanahele, Colin Kippen, Prof. Daviana McGregor, former OHA administrator Clyde Namu’o, and Native Hawaiian Legal Corp. director Moses Haia, among many others.

There is a question of whether the rule change gives the kind of legal protection that was the point of Federal recognition, or if it is merely a Federal sanction of a process already happening. The Hawai’i Independent ran a story questioning the validity of the rule change:

“We have to remember that this process started with the State of Hawai‘i, not the Hawaiian people,” [Andre] Perez told The Independent over the phone. “Hawaiians did not initiate or pass Act 195, which created Kana‘iolowalu. The state legislature did, and gave the governor the power to appoint members to the commission. True self-determination does not come with a state-initiated, state-controlled process like this.”

Keanu Sai happened to speak to my class the day after the rule change. As I pondered the question of whether this was a victory for the Fed Rec set, it seemed to have no effect on Sai’s view that it was simply more Federal legislation inapplicable in foreign (Hawaiian) territory.

My article in The Nation – the original

There were several versions, but you may be able to see the difference between the final version and this one below: The Nation edited it to be more colloquial (I wasnʻt too happy about that) but also had one of the most rigorous fact checking regimens of any US publication (that was good). I didnʻt have many “wrong” points, but had to “tone down” some of the language from this original. Also, some had to be cut for their (restrictive for this topic) 1000-word limit. But The Nation is the oldest weekly newsmagazine in the US. Founded in 1865, it is celebrating its 150th anniversary this year (2015). It is also the most important media outlet of the left, and I was quite proud to write for them. You should see some significant differences in turns of phrase and the way data is presented.

On June 24^th, in the conference room of the Hawaiʻi State Capitol in Honolulu, Native Hawaiians gathered for the first of several hearings held by the U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) throughout the Hawaiian Islands as well as on the U.S. continent. The hearings were held to ask Native Hawaiians for input on the formation of a Federally recognized nation. Surprisingly, after decades of endeavoring to achieve such a status, the overwhelming response to the panel of DOI officials was “aʻole” – no. At the Honolulu hearing, Political Science Professor Noelani Goodyear-Kaʻōpua questioned the “reestablishing of a relationship” between the Federal government and the Native Hawaiian community, when no relationship existed other than the treaty relationships with the Hawaiian Kingdom. She asked DOI to recognize that “you are on our land,” proposed “free, prior and informed consent” and neutral international monitoring. Several speakers also reminded DOI that Hawaiʻi was previously a neutral, multi-ethnic country, and stated that the descendants of its non-native citizens were now being disenfranchised. Between two and five percent at all the hearings spoke in favor, including Hawaiian Roll Commissioner Naʻalehu Anthony, who said he did not want to pass the struggle on to his son after watching three generations fight for Hawaiian rights.

Mainstream media coverage focused on tone, rather than content and missed the real story, which was that a shift in Hawaiian political will and a consensus had emerged over the proper route to sovereignty. In a community known for its divisiveness, this shift was quite stunning. Under the radar, a new view of Hawaiian history had taken hold, one in which debates over the history of the Hawaiian Kingdom, overthrown in 1893, were at the center.

Unified in 1810 by King Kamehameha I, Hawaiʻi was recognized internationally as a sovereign, independent country beginning in 1843. Fifty years later, the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi had treaties with nearly all the sovereign states in existence, including five with the US. In 1893, Queen Liliʻuokalani was overthrown by sugar businessmen backed a company of US Marines. President Cleveland called this unauthorized intervention an “act of war,” withdrew the proposed annexation treaty and agreed to reinstate Liliʻuokalani. On Feb February 9^th, 1893, The Nation wrote, “We could not by annexation at the moment gain anything which we do not now possess.” A standoff between the President and Congress over the question of annexation prevented any action for five years.

When William McKinley took office in 1897, he attempted a second treaty, but this failed in the Senate, in part because of petitions opposing annexation. When the Spanish-American war broke out the following year, McKinley and annexationists in Congress led by Alabama Senator (and Ku Klux Klan “Dragon”) John Tyler Morgan decided, in the words of Congressman Thomas Ball of Texas, “to do unlawfully that which can not be done lawfully.” In 1898 they purported to annex Hawaiʻi via Joint Resolution. While the Congress issued a formal apology to the Hawaiian people in 1993 “for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of agents and citizens of the United States,” it is the subsequent annexation by resolution that lies at the heart of the current drama.

Those who accept that Hawaiʻi was annexed, legally or not, have pursued a course of Federal recognition leading to a limited form of “sovereignty.” This view is epitomized by former Governor John Waiheʻe, who said at the University of Hawaiʻi that one “would have to be illiterate” not to recognize the illegality of annexation, but questions how such a position would benefit Hawaiians. Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) Trustee Oswald Stender said more bluntly, on film, that Hawaiʻi was illegally annexed, but “so what?” The “domestic” approach to sovereignty first took form in the proposed Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act – the so-called “Akaka Bill” – named after its sponsor, the Native Hawaiian Senator Daniel Akaka. The bill circulated through Congress for twelve years before expiring with its sponsor’s retirement and the death of senior Senator Daniel Inouye in 2012. A new approach was devised in which the Department of Interior would propose “rule-making” changes that would allow Hawaiians to join the more than five hundred native nations already in existence. Fitting Hawaiians’ unique history into the template for Federal recognition has been a persistent challenge for advocates of this approach.

Others, taking the law at face value, find that if annexation was illegal, it is tantamount to saying that it did not occur at all. As a mere domestic instrument, a resolution, it is argued, cannot have effect in foreign territory. This means Hawaiʻi is under a prolonged military occupation, albeit one that the United States has not yet admitted to. The independence view was buoyed by a case in the International Court of Arbitration involving Hawaiʻi as an independent country. Hawaiʻi will also be listed in the 2013 War Report, a catalog of contemporary international conflicts published in Geneva, Switzerland, as an occupied state. The independence camp was given a further lift when in May, OHA CEO Kamanaʻopono Crabbe sent a letter to US Secretary of State John Kerry asking for “advisement” on possible breaches of international law stemming from OHA support of Federal Recognition. Unsurprisingly, the letter caused uproar on one side and prompted petitions of support on the other.

At its root, the conflict between supporters of independence and Federal recognition stems from divergent beliefs about law and power. Independence advocates view the international law and specifically the law of occupation as safeguards against the continuation of an illegally constituted, and essentially occupying, government – the State of Hawaiʻi. They call not for decolonization, but deoccupation, as was done in the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) upon the breakup of the Soviet Union. Federal recognition supporters are sometimes beneficiaries of Hawaiian “entitlements” such as the Federal Hawaiian Home Lands homesteading program or are U.S. military veterans, and argue that the United States would never allow a withdrawal regardless of Hawaiʻi’s legal status internationally. These views and the paths they imply appear to be mutually exclusive, making reconciliation difficult. Some suggest that a further reexamination of Hawaiʻi’s widely misunderstood history is implicated as the only route to any kind of reconciliation.

ʻUmi Perkins teaches Hawaiian history at the Kamehameha Schools and Political Science in the University of Hawaiʻi system.

Occupation redux

In the (proposed) 1899 Hague Regulations, the basic premise of the law of occupation was stated:

The country invaded submits to the law of the invader; that is a fact; that is might; but we should not legalize the exercise of this power in advance, and admit that might makes right (Beernaert in Benvenisti, 2012, 90).

In the fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) (which was crafted to with the “aim of imposing on occupants ʻa heavy burden”) (Benvenisti, 2012, 97), the norm was codified that the occupant (occupier) must take three considerations into account: “itʻs own security interests, the interests of the ousted government, and those of the local population, which may be different from the interest of their legitimate government” (Benvenisti, 2012, 69).

First Geneva Convention, 1864

The norms of GCIV were formed in the context of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, which created an expectation that during occupation the occupying military and the civilian population could be kept at a distance from each other and even co-exist relatively harmoniously (Benvenisti, 2012, 70). As for changes to law, they were to be kept at an absolute minimum, but were allowable for the purpose of making occupation practicable and functional on the ground. Benvenisti (2012, 90) notes that the rule that changes to law are only when “absolutely necessary … has no meaning” because the occupant is never absolutely prevented from complying to local law.

Article 43 of the GCIV was a mandate to “restore and ensure public order and civil life” – this came to be seen as an “incomplete instruction to the occupant” because of the conflicts of interest between occupant and the ousted government (Benvenisti, 2012, 71).

Changes to the law of occupation also continued as human rights became more of a concern to the international community. As this occurred, actual occupants began to seek to avoid the responsibilities of occupation by “purport[ing] to annex or establish[ing] puppet states or governments, rely[ing] on ʻinvitations’ from indigenous governments [the Soviet/Russian formula]” and other means (Benvenisti, 2012, 72).

But as is often pointed out, these means are not legitimate as GCIV states “the benefits [or applicability] of the [Geneva] Convention shall not be affected … by any annexation … of the whole or part of the occupied territory.” In short, the occupant retained the duty to fulfill its obligations under the law of occupation (GCIV in Benvenisti, 2012, 73).

As with all legal documents and doctrines, however, it is “impossible to read the drafting history of the GCIV without paying close attention to the diverse concerns of the different state representatives” (Benvenisti, 2012, 98). That is to say, it is contingent on the conditions of the time and context in which it was crafted.

HUMAN RIGHTS

As it developed in the twentieth century, the human rights regime came to decenter the law of occupation’s emphasis on the agency of states as the only actors. People came to play a role in international law, under which previously only states were subjects. In the occupation of Iraq, for example, Amnesty International pushed for changes in Iraqi law – normally in contravention of the law of occupation – for the purpose of the protection of human rights. Occupation was in this case seen as an opportunity to improve conditions for the citizens of the occupied state (a rare, but quite possible scenario). Sharia law was in this case seen as “incompatible” with GCIV rights (Benvenisti, 2012, 103).

NECESSITY

Keanu Sai has used the “doctrine of necessity” as a justification for forming the Acting Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom; the necessity of an “organ” to speak on behalf of the occupied state, in other words, necessitated the creation of a “government” whose legitimacy would otherwise be highly questionable. Benvenisti notes this doctrine as a “recognized justification for legislation by the occupant,” but noted that it does not apply to the civil and criminal laws of the occupied state: “the penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force,” (Benvenisti, 2012, 96) ostensibly to prevent draconian trials and execution of resisters against the occupation. However, it is also recognized that the occupant would be “prevented from respecting the laws in force” in the rare case that they “conflicted with its obligations under international law, especially [the GCIV] (brackets original)” (Benvenisti, 2012, 102).

DEBELLATIO

Sai also notes that Debellatio, or conquest, while seen as a legitimate form for the transfer of sovereignty, was essentially outlawed in the Americas – by the United States and some of the recognized sovereigns in South America – because they feared their former colonial overlords would re-conquer them. This, in his view, was the purpose of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. As Jay Sexton notes in his book  The Monroe Doctrine, “American statesmen exploited fears of foreign intervention in order to mobilize political support” (Sexton, 2011, 12). Sexton also notes how the Tyler Doctrine (actually proclaimed in 1842 by secretary of state Daniel Webster) “effectively extended the 1823 message  [the Monroe Doctrine] to Hawaiʻi” (Sexton, 2011, 112). As a result, the United States does not recognize debellatio – conquest – as a legitimate form of transferring sovereignty. This quells any argument that even though there was no conquest of the Hawaiian Kingdom, “there would be.”

MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

The occupant is allowed to collect taxes, “as far as is possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force … to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory” (Benvenisti, 2012, 81). In other words, the occupant should not, as was seen in the film The Last Emperor, make the occupied “pay for its own occupation” as the Japanese ambassador says to the Emperor of Manchuria (Manchukuo). The occupant is also bound by the general rules regarding property of usufruct – the use of land without destroying it (Benvenisti, 2012, 77). This is relevant to the U.S. presence in Hawaiʻi as evidenced by the more than one hundred Superfund sites at Pearl Harbor alone.

NATIONALS OF THE OCCUPYING POWER

My own understanding of the law of occupation is that it strictly prohibits the “overwhelming” of the nationals of the occupied state with settlers from the occupying state, as was done by Russia to Estonia and other Baltic states. Benvenisti treads very lightly here, noting only that settlement need only avoid “impinging on the rights” of the citizens of the occupied state. It is possible (though I donʻt mean to hastily accuse him) that his status as an Israeli influences this light treatment of settlers, and he does mention Israel, the West Bank and Gaza in the very short section on this topic (Benvenisti, 2012, 106-107).

Occupation

This post is a way for me to sort out my ideas and understandings of the concept of occupation. It is also for my students in the course Protest under Occupation in the Matsunaga Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, to clarify the very dense readings in Benvenisti’s The International Law of Occupation and other readings.

Eyal Benvenisti (2012, 1) states that “the law of occupation is intimately related to the law of sovereignty, and to a large extent serves as its mirror image.” This underscores the quite central point that the law of occupation applies only to recognized sovereign states. This has been an area of some confusion for me (and I suspect others), since Israel’s presence in Palestine (Gaza and the West Bank) has been called “occupation” for many years. This term would apply now, since Palestine received recognition from the majority of UN members, in both the General Assembly and UNESCO. But it should not have applied before such recognition. The seeming milestone of recognition has passed almost unnoticed. This is a cause for concern over the effectiveness of the law of occupation, and indeed of recognition itself. There is one caveat: it some hold that full recognition of a state that is seceding must be recognized by the state it is seceding from (i.e., Israel must recognize Palestine).

Human rights law professor Eval Benvenisti

Some premises of the law of occupation:

Occupation is considered “a state of exception for international law.” As Giorgio Agamben notes, the sovereign is that for which a state of exception exists in terms of the law, i.e., the sovereign is “he” to whom the law does not apply.

Giorgio Agamben

Because the law of occupation begins to apply once a law has already been broken (the first law of nations – that law of non-intervention), occupation thus fills a “governance gap” providing some type of governance where the occupied government is overthrown.

Temporary allegiance: “inhabitants are under [the occupant’s] sway and have to render obedience to his commands.”

The bases of the law of occupation include the Hague regulations, Geneva Convention IV, and customary international law.

The working definition of occupation involves the occupier (or “occupant”) having “effective control” and “boots on the ground”- that is, it actually controls the territory, rather than merely claiming to control it. Occupation is thus a “de facto regime” – a regime “in fact,” but not “in law” (de jure).

The Occupant has no title to territory, but this “does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities under international law” (Benvenisti, 2012). The occupant is also “responsible for local public institutions such as the local police, which [it] directs and controls,” in other words, it is responsible for maintaining order during the occupation.

While some have questioned the relevance and effectiveness of the law of occupation, according to Benvenisti:

Despite … the evolution of new normative frameworks such as the law on self-determination or human rights law, the law of occupation has retained its relevance and significance (Benvenisti, 2012, 19).

Origins of the concept

Occupation was “conceived as a temporary regime existing until the conclusion of a peace agreement between the enemy sides” (Benvenisti, 2012, 20). It is thus the “mirror image of the concept of sovereignty” (Benvenisti, 2012, 21). According to eighteenth century international legal theorist Emmerich de Vattel, there is “no difference between [an] occupant and a conqueror who may treat the territory gained as under its sovereignty”(Benvenisti, 2012, 23).

Characterization of Occupation

Occupation begins: “once control is established” – i.e., there is no delay between the beginning of occupation and the responsibilities afforded to the occupant, he is immediately responsible (Benvenisti, 2012, 55).

Occupation ends when: 1) there is a loss of effective control, 2) the occupant can no longer exercise authority, 3) the consent of the sovereign is granted through a peace treaty, or 4) there is a transfer of authority to a government endorsed by the occupied population through internationally-recognized referendum.

Occupation is by definition military in nature, and rather than granting unlimited powers on the occupier, places obligations on them – to administer a temporary government, provide services, etc. This obligation begins immediately. At first, the law of occupation granted very few protections to the residents of an occupied state, and even allowed for punishment of those who defy the occupying government’s dictates. This is problematic for those who currently deny the validity of the State of Hawaiʻi and its government apparatus. But the law evolved over time to grant further rights and protections to the occupied.

Melville in Hawaiʻi

When E.L. Doctrow said on the Charlie Rose show that Moby Dick was the greatest American novel and that Melville had accomplished something truly monumental (which, of course, was not recognized in his time), I resolved to finally read the book. Along the way I developed something of an obsession with this introverted and under appreciated writer. I visited his home in Pittsfield, Massachusetts – the town next to the one my wife is from, and the one she was born in. I stood in the room where he had written the Great Book, and on the piazza where he had written The Piazza Tales. I stood in the house at Tanglewood – summer home of the Boston Symphony Orchestra in Lenox and Stockbridge – which was rented by Nathaniel Hawthorne, a friend and supporter of Melville’s literary career, whom Melville would have visited around 1850.

Herman Melville, ca. 1860

Melville’s brief brush with fame, which allowed him to write Moby Dick, obviously stemmed from his experiences in the Pacific, but one of his lesser-known visits was to Hawaiʻi in 1843. It was an auspicious year, and Melville was privy to the Paulet Affair (which Iʻve written about in these “pages” more than once). On February 14th, 1843, Lord George Paulet seized the sovereignty of Hawaiʻi in response to complaints of the British Consul that the Kingdom had rescinded a grant of land (the 1840 Constitution held that the king controlled all land). His experiences were recounted in an appendix to Typee. Melville was present for the end of the affair, when Hawaiians in their joy reveled in what Melville described as a kind of “Polynesian saturnalia.” He tells of ten days of “universal broad-day debauchery” (see Stephen Sumida’s  And the View from the Shore: Literary Traditions of Hawaiʻi).

What Melville (who has been lauded as a beacon of racial tolerance in part because of his autobiographical friendship with Queequeg – probably a Maori – in Moby Dick) failed to comprehend was Hawaiians’ periodic episodes of free and open sexual contact. Kaimipono Kaiwi has written, in bold defiance of received wisdom that Melville was a racist. Certainly his account of the first Lā Hoʻihoʻi Ea (Restoration Day) throws his tolerant image into question.

The Secret Session: Purpose of the Overthrow of Hawaiʻi

Last year on this date, January 17th, I posted an article on the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy. It remains the most  viewed article on the umiverse. But the purpose of the overthrow was annexation, so this year I’m focusing on the secret debate of the US Senate over annexation – one of the least studied and, in my view, most fascinating primary sources in the history shared between the US and Hawaiʻi.

On May 31, 1898, the US Senate went into a closed session to discuss, among other things, the annexation of Hawaiʻi. The “overthrow” of January 17th, 1893 was, in many ways, a non-event and its reality depended entirely on the United States’ desire to follow through with annexation, which was the purpose of the overthrow. The discussion of a joint resolution, the Newlands Resolution, occured because a treaty of annexation had already been voted down. In these debates, sometimes between the lines, we find that the Senate was enabling the President to “act” on annexation – a fact that shows that what was occuring was occupation, rather than annexation. I referred to this debate in my presentation at TEDx Mānoa in October, 2012. Here I present the full transcript (itʻs long) of the secret session. My source is the Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics, vol. 1, (2004):

SENATE SECRET DEBATE ON SEIZURE OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

U.S. SENATE.

TUESDAY, May 31, 1898.

WAR-REVENUE BILL.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The morning business appears to be closed.

Mr. ALLISON. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of

the revenue bill.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Iowa asks the Senate to

proceed to the consideration of House bill 10100, to provide ways and

means to meet war expenditures. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole,

resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 10100) to provide ways and

means to meet war expenditures.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, as I have no desire to speak behind closed

doors this morning, I shall not call up the amendment which I offered on

Friday last. I had intended to use the subject of that amendment merely

as an illustration of an argument which I desire to make. I shall dispense

with the illustration, if it is to condemn me to a secret legislative session,

and make the argument, which contains nothing, so far as I am aware,

that would require closed doors even under the narrowest construction of

our rules.

My service in Congress, Mr. President, has not been very long, but I

have served now some eleven years in both branches of Congress, and in

that time I have been able to observe and understand, I think, the rule and

power of a minority.

In the Fifty-first Congress I had the honor to be a very obscure member

of the party which, under bold and admirable leadership, reformed the

House rules. The House of Representatives had then fallen into a

condition where it was unable practically to do business, and that reform

of the rules, one of the greatest reforms in our system of parliamentary

government that has been seen, principle that in this country the majority

ought to rule, and that an American House of Representatives which was

unable to do business, except at the will of a minority, was a travesty on

American Government: that is, the proposition was that a majority ought

to have a right to act upon any question they desired, whether favorable

or unfavorable. That reform, as I have said, was carried out. It made a

great stir and excitement at the time. After the storm had passed, the

wisdom of it was fully seen. It was approved by the courts and by the

people.

But it seems, Mr. President, that systems are stronger than reforms and

than man. The new system contains the old principle. The minority has

been changed, but it is still the minority that rules. It is now a minority

selected by a majority at the start, instead of a fortuitous group, but the

principle of minority rule is unchanged. In this body, where there has

never been any change in the rules, it is also well known that unless

under exceptional circumstances, unless there is a great popular demand

or a very overwhelming majority, a determined minority can prevent

action on a given matter of legislation.

Mr. President, if we assume for a moment that there is a measure which

has been twice urged by the President in a message, that the

Administration is known to desire it, and a majority in both Houses

desire it also, and if under those circumstances we are unable to have a

vote upon that measure in either House, nothing remains to the members

of a helpless majority but to utter their protest. Even that privilege has

been taken away elsewhere. But here in the Senate it is still possible for

a member of the helpless majority to say at least what he thinks ought to

be done, and to call the attention of the country, so far as one feeble

voice may be able to do so, to the situation that exists. If such a situation

as I have described exists, then it is desirable that the country at this

period of war should know it. It is for this reason that I have taken the

floor.

Some senators were prompt to criticise me for the amendment I

introduced, apparently with the idea that I intended to block and to

obstruct the war-revenue bill now before the Senate. Mr. President, I

have never, to my knowledge, attempted to obstruct legislation in this

body. I have no intention of trying to obstruct this great bill now, either

by amendment or by speech, but I do think that the situation is such as to

deserve a few moments of discussion. I believe that we ought to pass not

only the war-revenue bill as a war measure, but every other war measure

that the Administration desires, every other measure which it regards as a

military necessity. I for one am not ready to vote to adjourn until all the

measures necessary for the prosecution of the war or thought necessary

by the Administration have been acted upon by Congress.

The President of the United States is charged with the great

responsibility of war. In his hands are the war powers of the

Constitution. If a helpless majority in the two Houses of Congress are

unable to give him in certain directions the legislation he needs, he can

employ the war powers. If he does employ them, he will be justified and

applauded by the entire country. But, Mr. President, such action will

elevate the executive power still higher in the public mind. It will lower

the legislative power in the public mind. This has been a deplorable

tendency of late years. It is one that I certainly do not desire to see

accentuated, and yet if Congress does not perform its whole duty, that is

the position in which it is likely to find itself, and it is to its own prestige

and its own standing that it will administer the blow.

The President is charged with the conduct of the war. The glory falls to

him of successful war and triumphant peace, and on him rests also the

heavy responsibility. If disaster comes, whether he be innocent or not of

the disaster, whether it is owing to his plans being mistaken or not, it is

on him it will fall, and therefore he has the right to ask of Congress the

prompt support of every measure which is his judgment and that of his

advisers is necessary to the conduct of the war, and until he receives

from Congress every aid he can fairly demand, Congress should not

adjourn. Until the Administration is ready to say, and does say, that the

President does not desire the further presence of Congress in session, it

seems to me it is our plain duty to stay here, in order to pass the

measures he may desire and give him all the assistance he needs. When

he has received all the measures he thinks the military necessity of the

times may demand, when he feels that there is no longer need of the

presence of Congress, he can signify it to us.

Mr. President, far more important to my mind than the amendment which

I have not been able to use as an illustration is the question of

adjournment. I for one, anxious as I personally am to leave Washington

and return to my home, will never give a vote for adjournment, and I am

against the policy that seeks to hasten an adjournment, until the President

has received every measure he asks and until in his judgment it is fitting

and proper that Congress should retire.

Mr. President, the existing conditions which have led me to make this

statement, which would have led me, could I have had the freedom to do

so, to discuss the amendment I offered Friday, I desire very briefly to

describe. At the end of April the President ordered the Asiatic squadron

to attack the Spanish fleet, to capture and destroy it.

Mr. TURPIE. I ask the honorable Senator from Massachusetts whether

he means to discuss the subject-matter of his amendment?

Mr. LODGE. I have already stated that I did not, and I have not alluded

to it. I do not think Admiral Dewey’s victory, about which I am about to

speak, is a subject for executive session.

Mr. TURPIE. No; but—

Mr. LODGE. I have not mentioned the Hawaiian Islands, and I do not

propose to do so, if that is what the Senator means.

Mr. TURPIE. That is what I mean. Under that construction of the—

Mr. LODGE. I stated at the beginning that I did not intend to allude to

the subject-matter of my amendment. I do not intend to discuss it, but I

propose to discuss the general aspect of the war, and that I think I have a

right to do.

Mr. WHITE. I desire to refer the distinguished Senator from

Massachusetts to the proposition that some time ago, when the general

subject-matter of the war was to be discussed, we were remanded to the

executive-session provision of the rules; and what is fair for one is fair

for another. There may be an omission of a name, and yet the whole

subject may be discussed. I am perfectly willing to discuss the Hawaiian

question in the open, and have tried to do so very often. Having been

denied that right, those of us who have certain views upon the topic will

insist that anything relating to that subject shall be discussed in secret

session, unless we are allowed throughout to debate the matter in the

open, a debate from which we have never in any way shrunk and which

has been forced into privacy by the vote of the Senate.

Mr. LODGE. I thought I explained when I began that I had desired to

use the subject-matter of my amendment as an illustration of the

argument I was about to make. I understood that if I did we would be

put into secret legislative session. The argument that I desired to make

seemed to me important. The Hawaiian matter I wanted to use simply as

an illustration. I do not propose to discuss the matter of Hawaiian

annexation. I do not propose to make any argument upon it. I propose

simply to discuss the existing military situation, not future events, but

past events, and where those past events have left us. I have not yet said

one word that has gone in the least diplomatic or international question.

I do not intend to do so if I can possibly avoid it.

The name of Hawaii would not have crossed my lips if Senators on the

other side had not asked the questions. I did not intend to allude to the

islands. The subject of Admiral Dewey’s victory and the necessity of

supporting him are open questions. That is the past. He is in Manila.

That is a fair subject for public discussion, and that is all I had started to

speak of. I do not know why Senators start in alarm when I mentioned

the Asiatic squadron. That is far remote from Hawaii.

Mr. WHITE. I wish to correct the Senator from Massachusetts if he

thinks that I started in alarm at anything he said today or may say at any

future time.

Mr. LODGE. I am glad the Senator is so full of courage.

Mr. WHITE. It would not require very much courage to make that

remark.

Mr. LODGE. No; I think not. The Senator, I am sorry to see, seems

annoyed, but I did not intend to be annoying.

I was beginning to speak of the Asiatic Squadron. At the end of April

that squadron was sent with orders to capture and destroy the Spanish

fleet. How that order was obeyed the world knows. Admiral Dewey

descended on Manila and swept the Spanish fleet out of existence. As

brilliant in conception as Aboukir and even more complete in its

execution and results, that victory is one of the greatest naval actions of

the century. We have to go back as far as Trafalgar to find one equally

perfect in execution, more vast in its results. There he was sent by the

orders of the President to make this attack; a wise attack, Mr. President,

for it is not alone necessary in war to defend; it is also necessary, if we

would have peace, to attack. The attack on Spain’s most valuable

possession was the quickest road to a victorious peace. There, then, was

the American admiral, with his victorious fleet, and Manila helpless

under his guns. It is all-important to support him.

If, Mr. President, anything should befall Admiral Dewey, if any adverse

fortune should come to him and to his fleet after their great victory, the

American people would never forgive the Administration or the

Congress under whom it happened. They would feel as the English

people felt after the death of Gordon because no relief came to him at

Khartoum. The President of the United States has sent a war ship, the

Charleston, to Manila. He has sent 2,500 men. Seven thousand more

are even now getting ready. They will go in a few days. They will be

followed by the great armored ship, the Monterey. One of the best of

American generals has been appointed to command. All these things are

wise, prudent, and pave the way to peace, triumphant peace, for the

United States.

However, Mr. President, I may stand alone in my conception, but I

believe, and I have believed from the beginning, that Admiral Dewey

and his fleet were in a real and especial danger despite the distance from

Spain, and that the President was wholly justified in his strong and

admirable policy of supporting him.

Mr. TURPIE. Mr. President, I have listened to these remarks for some

time, if the honorable Senator will allow me, and I do not think they are

such remarks as ought to be made public. I move that the Senate proceed

to the consideration of this subject in secret legislative session.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. Is the motion seconded?

Mr. COCKRELL. I second the motion.

The Vice-PRESIDENT. According to Rule XXXV, the Chair is obliged

to direct that the galleries be cleared and the doors closed.

The Senate thereupon proceeded to deliberate with closed doors.

At the expiration of five minutes, the Reporter was recalled.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. President—

Mr. LODGE. Before the Senator from Delaware proceeds, the little

statement I made was not taken down.

Mr. GRAY. Make it again.

Mr. LODGE. I will make it over again if it is desired. It was simply to

the effect that I had not intended to discuss anything that could by any

stretch of the imagination be supposed to be the subject of secret

legislative session; that I was engaged in explaining why I had felt that it

was so important to give every support to Admiral Dewey; that the

reason why I felt so was because there was a great and powerful interest

in Europe directly interested in having Manila wrested from him and his

fleet destroyed; that that was the great interest of the Spanish bonds and

the Spanish loan, chiefly held by the bankers of Paris, and that though

they would advance money to Spain for no other purpose they would

advance money to Spain for that purpose. That was the reason it seemed

to me why he needed special support. That was the extent of my

argument, except that I was going to add I thought the Administration

was doing everything in its power to support him.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. President, the propriety of the rule which the Chair has

just administered in closing the doors in order that we might consider

whether the discussion which the Senator from Massachusetts was

indulging in ought to be made in public or with closed doors was never

more apparent, it seems to me, than it is today. That rule has been there

time out of mind no doubt, but I do not think that any of us who are

members of the Senate now, unless perhaps the senior Senator from

Vermont (Mr. MORRILL), has ever sat in this body to perform the high

function of a Senator while war was flagrant. If there is a time it seems

to me it is now when there should be the greatest care in discretion by

men in public place, men who occupy seats in this body or the other,

when discretion should be had with caution and should be indulged in

with that circumspection which will prevent its ever being used by the

common enemy of the country, giving aid and comfort, no matter how

small, to those who are seeking to thwart the policy of the United States

or inflict injury upon it.

Of course it is impossible to anticipate just where the remarks of any

Senator, and of the Senator from Massachusetts in this case, would lead;

but certainly at the time when the Senator from Indiana interrupted him

he was discussing a most interesting phase of the war. He was indulging

in a discussion which I should be very glad to hear. He was speaking of

matters of the utmost importance, of matters which we should all

consider, and which should be addressed to our judgment in molding and

deciding upon our conduct. But nevertheless they were matters that

concern the policy of the Government in carrying on the war.

He was discussing the weakness or the strength of the U.S. in regard to

one great theatre of war, the Asiatic waters, and as I understood the

Senator from Mass. he was pointing out certain reasons why the U.S.

were weak in their present position, or at least needed strengthening by

some policy not yet fully developed by the Senator. In that case it seems

to me that so far as I could judge the trend of his remarks they ought to

be pursued, and certainly no harm can come from their being pursued, in

the secrecy of this legislative session.

Mr. LODGE. The Senator will pardon me. He very naturally

misunderstood me, because of course I had not an opportunity to say

what I was going to say, having been cut off in this way. I was not going

to say that we were to disclose any weakness there—not at all. I was

simply going to exhibit reasons why in my mind justify the vigorous

measures of the administration in the support they were giving to

Admiral Dewey, that was all.

Mr. GRAY. I think reasons pro or con for any military policy are much

more safely discussed behind closed doors than in public.

Mr. LODGE. These are not military reasons, I will say to the Senator,

they are purely political reasons.

Mr. GRAY. I do not understand the difference between political and

military reasons while war is flagrant. They all tend in the same

direction. Of course the Senator from Mass. is a patriotic Senator, we all

know that, and what he is seeking to do, if it be to point out to the

administration and to those who are vested with authority here certain

phases of the contest that deserve consideration, certainly it is important

for us to hear him, but it is not important that it should be addressed to

the ears of the enemy; and we had better take the chances of sitting

behind closed doors, even if the Senator does not seem to agree with me

that it is so important, than to run the risk of engaging in a discussion the

propriety of which is doubtful.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I have no intention, I had not the least

intention of saying anything that could give the slightest information to

the enemy, because I do not know anything that would give them any

information. I was referring to nothing that was not matter of public

notoriety in the newspapers, and far from making suggestions to the

Administration, I think their policy in regard to the manner in which they

are supporting Admiral Dewey is wholly admirable. Far from making

suggestions, I am well aware they can carry it out a great deal better than

I can or than any suggestion I could make. The point of my argument

has already been made and is in public print now. I was simply

endeavoring to back it up by what I thought was a description of the

existing situation.

Mr. HALE. Mr. President, it seems to me the whole situation is in a

nutshell. The Committee on Finance has reported a revenue measure to

endow the President and the Administration with the power to conduct

the war. But the bill is entirely in the line of taxation. I think it is a

matter of congratulation that the deliberations of the committee have

comprehended consultations of both parties upon the committee. It has

been felt that a patriotic duty rested upon us, Democrats and Republicans

alike. Unlike previous revenue bills where the party in power has

matured a bill and then reported its consideration to the other side and

where the bill has been put through by party pressure on each side, here

everybody on the committee, as I understand, has been consulted, has

been present at every meeting, and has contributed to the final result.

That there are differences has been shown from the beginning, but the

differences have been frankly stated to the Senate, and votes have been

taken and will be taken that will decide which policy shall settle the

result in raising revenue.

Mr. President, up to a very short time ago there was a manifestation of

restraint and of carefulness and prudence in not obtruding anything

except the actual fines raised by the bill. What should be taxed and how

much, whether a tax should be imposed upon corporations and to what

extent, how much if any legacy and succession tax should be imposed,

whether revenue should be raised by the seigniorage coined, or by a loan,

or by greenbacks—all of those things pertain to the essential quality of

the bill, a revenue raising measure; and we have proceeded in a calm and

deliberate way, with the opportunity for debate upon both sides, not

obtruding upon the bill any thing that raised a question as to the conduct

of the war. It has been to me a manifestation greatly to the credit of the

Senate that we have proceeded in this way, and never until the Senator

from Massachusetts (Mr. LODGE), perhaps the Senator from Alabama

(Mr. MORGAN) brought upon this bill the attempted discussion of

matters outside of the distinctive purpose of the bill has anything else

been brought before us.

It does not seem to me that it is a question what the Senator from

Massachusetts was going to say about Admiral Dewey, whether he was

to censure the Administration or not. It may seem essential to him, but it

does not seem essential to me.

Mr. LODGE. Why does the Senator say that I was going to censure the

Administration when just a moment ago I said I thought the conduct of

the Administration in the whole business was admirable?

Mr. HALE. The Senator said that, but I do not think upon this bill it is

an essential question that the Senator from Massachusetts should discuss

the war question and should praise or censure the Administration. We

ought to proceed and discuss the bill and the matters pertaining to it that

clearly, in the eye of everybody, are open matters before the Senate and

the world.

Surely, Mr. President, to-day when war is not simply threatened but is

upon us, it would seem as if it would appeal to every Senator that any

discussion of our resources or of our dangers or of rocks ahead upon

Admiral Dewey, or Admiral Sampson, or Commodore Schley or any of

the naval forces or the land forces should be either left silent and

untouched to the discretion of the Administration, or if we would wish to

confer and consult and discuss upon those matters we should then in this

time of war do it in secret session.

So I do not think that the answer of the Senator from Massachusetts that

he was only going on with reference to Admiral Dewey in a guarded way

is any answer to the proposition that we should go on, if at all, in secret

session. When he or any Senator departs from the purposes of the bill as

brought to us by the committee, opening up absolute and complete

discussion, no matter what it is, with reference to the war, we should

either let it alone or go into secret session and discuss it there and

determine what we should do.

It is an infirmity of this Govt., Mr. President, absolutely without avail

and without remedy, that we have not the power of conducting war by

any constituted tribunal that can proceed with that safety and security

which secrecy requires and insures. The last place in which to discuss

what shall be done about war, which goes on the wing of the lightning to

every part of the globe, is the Senate.

I hope that now and hereafter when this body does as it has a right to do,

confers and considers and discusses for we are a co-ordinate branch of

the Govt., any measures in relation to a war that is upon us we shall

come in here and sit as a board of directors do upon corporation interests,

and in the secrecy of the session that the laws and the Constitution

guarantee to use consider the grave subjects of war.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I am not able to comprehend any

possible secrets involved in the discussion of the annexation of the

Sandwich Islands. It is a question that has been discussed by the

American people for the last fifty years. There is no new question

connected with it which is not directly or indirectly connected with the

pending revenue bill. If we are to retain the Philippine Islands, to send a

large army there, we must have money for that purpose. “I supposed that

we were providing means for sending our forces to the Philippine

Islands, that that is a part of the revenue to be raised by this bill, and that

the extent of the appropriation will depend very largely upon the

purposes of the Govt. with regard to the occupation of those islands.”

Mr. WHITE. Will my friend permit me to ask him a question?

Mr. STEWART. Certainly.

Mr. WHITE. The Senator will no doubt recollect that some time ago the

Senator from South Dakota [Mr. PETTIGREW] had before the Senate a

resolution which he wished to discuss regarding annexation and several

members of the Senate, including myself, spoke in favor of having an

open discussion on both sides, everybody participating. Yet it was voted

down, and if my memory serves me right my friend from Nevada voted

in favor of going into executive session upon that proposition. Whether I

am mistaken in that or not, he certainly will agree with me that we

should have an exparte discussion of it in public, but that if it is to be

discussed at all in public it ought to be with reference to all parties

interested and all phases of the question.

Mr. STEWART. Most undoubtedly, but that was a question of ratifying

a treaty, and whether I voted that way or not, I do not remember.

Mr. WHITE. You voted that way.

Mr. STEWART. I did not see any particular reason for changing the rule

in regard to that.

Mr. WHITE. And the Senator voted the same way on the resolution

submitted by the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. PETTIGREW).

Mr. STEWART. This is a question which is entirely germane; it is a

question of the appropriation and occupation of the Philippine Islands. It

will take very largely more money if the purpose of the Administration is

carried out as indicated by the President’s order already made, and

preparations are made to occupy those islands. It has become now a

military necessity and the Administration so regards it and believes that

those islands should be occupied.

There is nothing in the question of a secret character. The world knows

as well as we do how the Hawaiian Islands are situated; they understand

that it is necessary to have a coaling and resting place between the

United States and the Philippine Islands. There is no coaling station

there at all. We have, however, a contract for a coaling station, but we

do not know that we shall be able to get into it. Pearl Harbor cannot be

entered with ships, and there is no place for us to enter and coal without

further action. It would require an appropriation, which we shall never

be able to obtain, to dredge out the mouth of Pearl Harbor so as to get

entrance by ships. There is absolutely no landing place there. Either we

must have the Sandwich Islands or the Administration must recall

Admiral Dewey.

It would be preposterous; it would be monstrous to keep him there, and

allow effective communication with him to be cut off. The question is

now involved whether we shall sustain him at the Philippine Islands, or

whether he shall be recalled and the expedition abandoned, or shall we

hold the islands?

It is stated in the public press that we may be under the military necessity

of taking the Hawaiian Islands. That will be placing the Administration

in a very embarrassing situation. If neither House of Congress will take

permanent action and it becomes a military necessity for the President to

act without the sanction of Congress, it will be the gravest subject which

has been presented in this Congress for a long time. It would be

humiliating indeed, pending this war, to be compelled to call back

Admiral Dewey; and the world would laugh at us if we should pursue

such a course. I say we should not give up those islands if the people

will not tolerate giving them up at this time. Whatever may be the

disposition after the war, whatever action we may come to take, the

American people would not now consent, nor would any of us consent to

the giving up of the Philippine Islands until the war is closed.

Mr. WOLCOTT. I rise to a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Colorado will state his

parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. WOLCOTT. As I understand the rules of the Senate, what is now

under discussion is the motion to continue in secret legislative session,

and the question is, whether or not we shall continue in secret legislative

session, or whether we shall go into open session? I ask if I am correctly

informed.

Mr. CULLOM. Before the answer is made, I wish to ask if the Senator

from Mass. did not close his remarks when the secret legislative session

was ordered?

Mr. STEWART. I only yielded the floor for a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. CULLOM. I only asked a question for information.

Mr. STEWART. I did not yield the floor for a discussion.

Mr. CULLOM. I understand that I am not discussing the question.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Chair understands the question is, Shall

the discussion begun by the Senator from Mass. be proceeded with

behind closed doors?

Mr. STEWART. I apprehend that my remarks are relevant to that

motion. I am trying to make them relevant. I was showing that the

question was connected with the preparations to take possession of the

Philippines. Are we to quit now? If so, it will not cost so much money.

The operations which are to be conducted on the Pacific Coast will have

very much to do with the amount of money necessary to be raised. It

seems to me that it is not only germane, but it is a necessary part of this

bill to know the probable amount of money we shall require; and as the

Senator from Mass. has raised a proposition which goes to the very

essence of this revenue bill, I hope he may be able to talk in public,

because it cannot possibly injure the cause of the Government of the

United States, for I suppose there is hardly anybody in any part of the

world who does not know that the Hawaiian Islands would be a

convenient place for us to stop on our way to the Philippine Islands to

recoal, recruit, and resupply ourselves. I hardly think there is any body

ignorant enough to know that. If so, they are people too trifling to be

affected by the information, and they are of such a character that they

could not avail themselves of the information when given them if they do

not know it now. Consequently I hope there may be an open session.

Mr. WOLCOTT. I should like to ask the Senator, in whose remarks I

was very much interested, wherein would there be any disadvantage in

discussing this question behind closed doors if it is a question that

pertains to the wisdom or unwisdom of passing this bill? Inasmuch as

those who are to pass upon it are not shut out, but shut in, and we are in

here who are going to vote upon the question, where is the disadvantage

of discussing it behind closed doors?

Mr. STEWART. I am very glad to answer that question, because I think

that as we move on under present conditions, we are moved on a good

deal by the pulse of the people. They are our mentors, they are the force

behind us; and we are moving on with them, and consulting them. I

think wherever we can do so, we should take them into our confidence.

When we do so, it makes them feel stronger and better, and we are more

likely to succeed. I should like to have the American people taken into

our confidence with regard to this movement on the Pacific. If they are

opposed to our taking possession of the islands and sending troops to

there, we shall hear from them very soon. If they are in favor of it, there

will be expressions of opinion in that way.

I should like to have the speech of the Senator from Mass. made in

public, so that the American people can read it and we will then

understand how they view it, for everybody knows more than anybody.

Mr. HALE. Does the Senator think it would be a sensible thing for the

President and his advisers to take the public into their confidence about

every movement they may see fit to make? Does he think that would be

advisable?

Mr. STEWART. There are some movements which should be kept

secret, but this is not one of that kind.

Mr. CHANDLER. Will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. STEWART. Certainly; I am done.

Mr. CHANDLER. I should like to ask the Senator a question, if he is

done. I ask the Senator whether there may not be some information as

well as facts and movements which it would not be advisable to make

public? For illustration, suppose one Senator advocates the taking and

retaining permanent possession of the Philippine Islands—as I should

judge the Senator from Mass. (Mr. Lodge) would, for his remarks seem

to lead up somewhere in that direction—then suppose some other

Senator very much opposed to the annexation of the Philippine Islands

should get up and ventilate his views to the contrary would it not be, on

the whole, injurious to the country and to our prosecution of the war to

have that kind of open debate take place?

Mr. HALE. Whatever the result might be.

Mr. CHANDLER. Yes.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, as I understand the situation, though I

was not in the Chamber at the time the Senator from Mass. (Mr.

LODGE) was arrested in his remarks, he was discussing the whole tax

bill, and in the course of his remarks he made some observations upon

some topic that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. TURPIE) thought were

improper to be made in public, and thereupon a motion was made and

seconded, which, under our rules, carried us into secret legislative

session.

Now, upon what proposition are we in secret legislative session? Is it

upon the whole bill or is it upon the remarks of the Senator from Mass.?

If the Senator from Mass. was proceeding out of order, he ought to have

taken his seat when a suggestion of that kind was made. If he was

proceeding upon a topic, or in the course of his remarks used

observations which were calculated to prejudice the general welfare of

the United States, then the Senator from Indiana had the right to move to

go into secret legislative session.

The Senator from Mass. has said here in this session that he had already

stated to the public what he desired to say. I want to know whether, if

the vote is taken upon the proposition that is now before the Senate, we

are in secret session upon the entire bill, or whether we are in secret

session upon the remarks of the Senator from Mass.?

Mr. HALE. On the remarks of the Senator from Mass. undoubtedly.

Mr. MORGAN. Very good. The Senator from Mass. left the floor but I

do not know whether he intends to resume it or not. He has gotten into

the Record all the remarks that he says he desired to make upon a

particular subject that was under discussion at the moment, and, of

course, we have nothing to do but to go back into open legislative

session. We cannot, unless we intend to debate all of this bill in secret

legislative session, now remains longer in secret legislative session upon

any proposition that is before the Senate.

Mr. President, I wish to say that nothing would suit me so well, nor do I

believe anything would be more beneficial to this country, than for this

Senate to discuss all of this bill in secret legislative session.

I do not like the spirit which prompted the motion, not from the Senator

from Ind., but the spirit which has been referred to, which, in connection

with the subject referred to by the Senator from Colo., seemed to

anticipate that the question of the annexation of Hawaii was to be

brought under debate, and yet nothing has been said on that subject, or

intimated on the floor of the Senate, but the Committee on Finance have

met and have determined upon the amendment which the Senator from

Mass. the other day had printed and upon the amendment which I had

printed, that whenever those amendments, or subjects germane to those

amendments, come under discussion, we should go into secret legislative

session.

If there is any thing connected with the public welfare which prevents the

discussion of those questions, which have already been discussed ad

nauseam in public through the newspapers and everywhere else, then, of

course, we ought to go into secret legislative session, but if this is a

filibuster against the passage of a resolution or amendment of

annexation, then, Mr. President, it is not worthy of the occasion. If the

purpose is here by the committee to choke a man down in his freedom of

speech because in his opinion it is germane and proper that he should

speak of the situation of the Hawaiian Islands with reference to the war,

with reference to this bill of taxation, with reference to the future that

may come out of this, then, of course, close the doors, but do not

reproach a Senator who, in good faith and in perfect honesty and

sincerity of purpose, wants to bring to the attention of his colleagues

those facts in the case and those provisions of law which, many of them

decided by the Supreme Court of the U.S., appear to have been entirely

ignored by this learned Committee on Finance—do not reproach a

Senator for doing that.

This plan was made up in advance that the Senator from Mass. and

myself should be choked down by a proceeding of this kind whenever we

dared to mention anything in connection with Hawaii or that could by the

remotest inference be brought into that category.

I am here delighted, Mr. President, with the opportunity now, if I am

permitted to do so, of entering into the discussion not of the propriety of

the annexation of Hawaii as a measure of national policy, but of entering

into the discussion as to the necessity of annexing Hawaii or taking it

under military control while the war is going on.

The Senator from Mass. proposed the broad proposition, which has been

reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations here, to annex Hawaii,

the same proposition that is now pending in the House of

Representatives. The amendment which I proposed did not mention

Hawaii, nor did it mention any other island or place in the world. It

merely provided for what should be the powers of the President of the

United States in the conduct of this war when he was in countries that are

extra-territorial, and a more important question cannot possibly arise for

this Senate to determine than that, nor is there any question more

intimately connected with the purview and purpose of the bill of taxation

that is now pending before this body.

I do not intend at this moment of time to discuss the amendment which I

have had the honor to offer here, or the purport of it or the subject of it,

but at the proper time I will discuss it. I should very much prefer to have

the opportunity of discussing that question in secret session with a

reporter here to take down my remarks, and for the Senate afterwards to

determine whether they shall be printed or not. I should very much

prefer that personally. But while I prefer that, Mr. President, I have not

lost my respect for my own liberty of speech, and I do not think that I am

in any sense disposed to allow the committee to pass upon me before I

utter any remark, and to say that when I get up in the Senate the doors

shall be closed upon me. That is a reproach that I am not amenable to;

that is a liberty that no committee can take with me without an effort on

my part at least to defend myself and to protest against what I conceive

to be a wrong.

I am as considerate about the welfare of this country as any gentleman on

that committee, I am as urgent in favor of the passage of the bill to

provide for revenue for conducting this war as any gentleman on that

committee. I will take far less time than any of them in the discussion of

the bill, and yet I conceive that my rights are quite equal to any of them

on this floor. I may not have the wisdom to give good advice to the

Senate, but I have a conscience which responds, sir, to my convictions,

and a tongue that is not afraid to utter them in any place.

I regard this movement as being extremely unfortunate. Suppose these

doors remain closed, and we take up the whole subject of the annexation

of Hawaii, if you please, the subject of the disposition that is to be made

of the Island of Cuba, when we have occupied it, and of the Philippines

and Puerto Rico—suppose we take up these questions here in this secret

session, how much time will be saved in the passage of this bill? Why,

sir, if the doors were to remain open a sense of duty and propriety on the

part of any Senator in discussing this bill would admonish him that he

ought not to touch upon any feature of this question that is not germane

to the bill, or that he does not believe is germane to it. Does one who

desires the annexation of Hawaii as a war measure—one to which your

President is bound to resort with the consent of Congress or without it—

does one who proposes that, in the handling of it before the Senate, in the

discussion of it here, put himself in a position of antagonism to the

committee or of antagonism to the bill, or of antagonism to the war? By

no means, sir. Those men are the friends of the Government of the

United States who cast their eyes a little to the front, who forget the

elections in November, and legislate for the good of this country without

reference to who shall be returned to Congress at that time.

But, sir, this bill before us today—while I would not say that of it in open

session perhaps—is web and woof a political bill. It is nothing else but a

political bill. The parties are divided politically on almost every feature

of it; and the discussion, so far as it has gone now, has been a political

discussion. The silver question has been handled at large by everybody

who is concerned in the debate—I have had nothing to do with it–; the

income tax has been discussed freely and fully; and the powers of

income taxation have been discussed; the duty of corporations to pay

some part of the expenses in the conducting of this war for the support of

the Government has been very largely and intricately discussed; and in

the discussion and in the votes this Senate has divided itself upon party

lines. This is a party bill, and intended for politics, and not for the good

of the country. I am sorry to say it, sir, but it is true. I am saying it to

my colleagues in the Senate, not to the world unless the distinguished

reporter of the Senate happens to be present and gives my remarks out to

the world, which I presume will be done, not with my consent though,

but with my reprobation and utter disgust, for the man who will leave

this Chamber and go out and make a report of the language used by a

Senator in this secret legislative session is a scoundrel, to begin with,

because he is a man in whom you cannot repose any trust; and he is

bound to be.

Here we are with a speech broken in the middle, and the question before

the Senate is whether these doors shall remain closed or whether they

shall be opened; and having signified my desire or my preference that

they shall remain closed, I insist that they shall be closed on the whole

bill. If we are in earnest here about refusing to discuss questions which

might affect the situation of this country in a war with Spain, this bill

touches it at every feature. You cannot discuss one feature of this bill in

the open that is not directly connected with the subject of the conduct of

the war with Spain—not one.

Now that we have got the doors closed on it, let us stay here and dispose

of this bill. I shall vote to keep these doors closed if the question is

settled, as I think it is bound to be, that is to say, that the bill shall be

considered in secret session—not the remarks of the Senator from

Massachusetts, for he has left the floor, and has not persisted in a

discussion of the question he had in his mind and on his tongue at the

time the doors were closed on him. Let us discuss the whole bill here

now in secret session. We shall get through with it quicker, we shall

have freedom of speech, and Senators will have an opportunity of

expressing themselves upon any feature of this whole subject. There will

not be half the delay there would be if we had an open discussion about

Hawaii or any other thing connected with this subject.

I call for a distinct statement of the question before the Senate, whether

or not we shall remain in secret session to discuss the bill, or whether

there is some other topic before us that we have got to discuss in secret

session.

Mr. MORRILL. Mr. President., in relation to the point suggested by the

Senator from Ala. (Mr. MORGAN), I wish to say that, so far as I know

anything about it, there has been no vote in the Committee on Finance in

relation to the matter.

Mr. MORGAN. If the Senator will allow me a second, the honorable

Senator from Iowa (Mr. ALLISON) told me he was instructed by the

committee to move to close the doors both upon the Senator from Mass.

(Mr. LODGE) and myself whenever we came to discuss our respective

amendments.

Mr. MORRILL. Various topics were discussed by the committee, but no

action was had in my presence.

Mr. President, it is obvious that the United States cannot have a war

without it being a great war, and if it is to be conducted with success, it

must be conducted by the Executive Department. It cannot be conducted

by a town meeting, nor can it be conducted by a committee of safety. I

regret to have seen some intimation which looked as though we might

ere long appoint a committee on the conduct of war.

Mr. President., of course we all have our difference of opinion to what

ought to be done or what should be done with countries we may conquer.

Some of us would be averse to ever retaining any of these dependencies

of foreign islands; and yet, I take it, there is none of us who would be

averse to retaining them as a pledge for such a sum of money as we may

demand from Spain whenever we close the war. I certainly would not be

willing to surrender anything we conquer unless we should get

something in the recompense for our losses and for the expenses of this

war.

In relation to the matter submitted by the Senator from Nev. (Mr.

STEWART) about Hawaii, I will say that we now have Pearl Harbor. To

be sure we cannot enter it with ships drawing any considerable amount of

water, but we can approach it and land any amount of coal, and take that

coal and put it on board any of our ships, only it will require a little more

labor, and we can do that without any further treaty with Hawaii or

without any apprehension of interference on the part of foreign

governments.

I had hoped, Mr. President, that we should get through with this bill

without running into a political debate. I want very much a debate in

open session in order that I many put on record some of my views in

relation to the annexation of Hawaii. The Senator from Ala. has already

placed his views before us in various reports, and we know how able and

how well put they are; but there has not been any speech by any Senator

opposed to the annexation of Hawaii which has ever been put upon

record; and my impression is that our people before any action is taken

should hear both sides of that question.

I hope we shall continue the discussion of the revenue measure in open

session. I do not think this measure has been considered as a political

question at all. My impression is—while, of course men have party

views, and they believe their own views are right and those of others are

wrong—when we have met together there has been a give and take about

the matter. So I think the members of the Senate never have been in

better mood than they are now in relation to doing exactly what is right

and what will best promote the success of our arms during the conflict

which is before us. I do not know anything about what the Senator from

Mass. (Mr. LODGE) has said; and therefore I say nothing regarding his

remarks; but I hope that we shall return to open session and make some

progress as desired by the committee in charge of the bill.

Mr. PETTIGREW. Mr. President, some months ago I introduced a

resolution, not with regard to the annexation of Hawaii, but a resolution

with regard to the policy of this Government in acquiring distant country,

which would require a navy to defend it, and the Senate decided that that

subject should be discussed in secret session.

I feel as I felt then, that the decision was wrong, and I think now that if

this question should be discussed at all, it should be discussed in open

session. For my part, I would rather discuss it in open session. I do not

shrink from the debate in open session upon the policy of the

Government in respect of acquiring distant colonies, as I believe the

American people should be taken into our confidence before any decisive

act is done in this direction.

I am willing to discuss the question even of the war—necessity of

Hawaii in open session, and I calculate we would have much the best of

the argument, for Hawaii is not on the line of the Philippine Islands and

no ship goes there unless it sails out of its way to go there. We own the

harbor of Unalaska and the island of Kista, both on the track of

commerce on the road to the Philippine Islands and by a route at least

500 miles shorter than the route by Honolulu. Yet no one clamors that

we shall place coal at these points where there are harbors to

accommodate every ship in our navy. No one insists that we shall fortify

them as a war measure in order to protect our recent possessions in the

Philippines. However, there is a clamor for islands not on the route, 500

miles out of the way which we do not own, and it is said that we must

take possession of them as a war measure. I am willing to discuss this

question before the American people, for these statements cannot be

again said or disputed. The world is a globe and not a plain surface, and

therefore the straight line from our port, either at Puget Sound or San

Francisco, to Manila does not come within thousands of miles or more

than a thousand miles of Honolulu, but does come within 200 miles of

Unalaska. I therefore hope the discussion will be continued in open

session, so that these questions may be laid before the American people.

Not only the American people it seems need to study geography on the

subject but the Senate itself, judging from the remarks made in regard to

the war necessity of acquiring Hawaii.

Mr. CULLOM. Would not the Senator be willing to consider those

questions on a separate measure?

Mr. PETTIGREW. I did not bring this debate here. I introduced an

amendment to abrogate the Hawaiian treaty after the amendment had

been introduced to acquire those islands.

Mr. CULLOM. I am aware of that.

Mr. PETTIGREW. And my amendment is more germane to the subject,

because if that treaty were abrogated it would save $10,000,000 a year

which could be used for the purpose of furthering the interests of the war.

Mr. CULLOM. I did not say the Senator had brought the matter here.

My question was whether he did not think it better to consider those

measures separate from the revenue bill?

Mr. PETTIGREW. I certainly do think so. I would not have brought the

question here myself, if it had not been brought here by others, and

neither shall I press my amendment if the others are abandoned. I am

willing to discuss the proposition, and I hope we shall be able to discuss

it in open session. How many ships of war and how many fortifications

would $10,000,000 a year build, which sum we now throw away in the

interest of a few sugar planters and adventurers.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. President, I should be very glad to hear I think in

open session the remarks of the Senator from Mass. (Mr. LODGE). So

far as I know he did not intend himself to say anything which I should

think it would do any injury to the country or embarrass the prosecution

of the war to have said. I am not so certain that what Senators might

have said in reply to him would not have been injurious to the country. I

voted on the occasion to which the Senator from South Dakota alludes,

when he has been discussing a general resolution as to the acquisition of

territory which might require a navy to protect, that that discussion

should proceed in secret session, because I did not see how he could

proceed far with his discussion without reaching the Sandwich Islands,

and I do not see how the Senator from Mass. could have considered at

length the question of reinforcing Admiral Dewey without reaching by

the way the Hawaiian Islands.

I am convinced by the statement of the Senator from Maine, with whom I

am happy to agree on this occasion, that all questions of this kind ought

to be discussed in secret session. I do not understand that the Committee

on Finance, who I am informed have considered this subject have

intended to insist upon a secret session on any portion of the bill except

this particular part of it, that is to say this Hawaiian amendment, if that is

insisted upon. Mr. President, I do not think that should be discussed in

open session, but while we are in secret session I take occasion to say

that I think the subject ought to be discussed by the Senate at no very

distant day. The amendment which the Senator from Mass. proposes

contains a proposition for the annexation of the islands which has already

been reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Relations. That

report was made on the 16th day of March, and Report No. 681, made by

the Senator from Minn., the chairman of the Committee (Mr. DAVIS),

who has adorned that report with all the learning and eloquence and force

which he always gives to the performance of every public duty of that

kind, states the reasons why we should acquire the Sandwich Islands.

That is a living question. It is more important in my judgment to have it

decided than that we should pass the war revenue bill. Our armies are

already on the way to the Philippine Islands. They are not going to

Unalaska or any of the other Alaskan islands, as suggested by the

Senator from South Dakota. They are going on the regular track, the

steamship line to Manila. They cannot go without stopping to coal at

Honolulu, and perhaps while we are now considering this subject several

thousand troops of the U.S. are landing at Honolulu or are in the harbor

of Honolulu seeking the opportunity to land.

The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. LODGE) tells me that the Navy

has 12,000 tons of coal in that harbor. How do our ships go in there? Do

they go into a port which we control, which we will protect by the power

of the United States, or do they go into a neutral port; and if Hawaii is

neutral its neutrality must be respected by the United States as much as

the neutrality of Haiti or any of the smaller powers of the globe. How

are our fleets and ships and transports going to Hawaii? If the neutrality

of Hawaii is respected there should not be a ton of coal allowed by the

government of Hawaii to be taken from our coal piles there and put upon

our ships. I say this is a present question, right off now. It is a question

of importance. It is one which creates anxiety to the Executive. After

the 7,000 troops which have already started shall have reached part way

on their journey, 10,000 more are going, as is a military governor, and

they are all going to stop at Hawaii. Shall they stay cooped up on the

war ships and transports or shall they get off upon those islands. It is a

question that ought to be met. It is a question, I take occasion to say,

which, while I am not at liberty to speak of the House of Representatives,

the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate should immediately

bring before the Senate, and in my belief they should bring it before the

Senate before the passage of the war revenue bill, rather than wait to let

it drag its slow length a week or two more.

If our ships go into Hawaii and our troops get off of those ships and

stretch themselves and if we take that coal upon board, the neutrality of

Hawaii is destroyed. She is subject as a matter of fact and subject as a

matter of international law to be captured by Spain for that act. If I am

wrong I should like to have any of the distinguished international

lawyers whom I have heard discourse in this body so much in years past

tell me that I am mistaken.

Mr. CAFFREY rose.

Mr. CHANDLER. I see one of them has already risen.

Mr. CAFFREY. We own a coaling station in the Hawaiian Islands.

Would we violate neutrality in time of war if we coaled there?

Mr. CHANDLER. I was about to allude to that fact. If the coal had been

in there, if this Government and Congress had done what the junior

Senator from Maine has often urged upon his body, if it had taken

possession of Pearl Harbor, if it had dug out the channel of Pearl Harbor

so that the ships could get into it, then there would have been some sense

in talking about Pearl Harbor. No, it would not destroy the neutrality of

Hawaii if we went into a harbor which we possessed by previously made

treaty.

Mr. President, the coaling station is there only in name and not in fact,

because the coal is not there and the ships cannot get into it, and we are

going right straight to Hawaii with all our ships and all our sailors and all

our troops on the assumption that it is a friendly power, not a neutral but

a friendly power, in alliance with us for the purposes of our war with

Spain.

Mr. BACON. Will the Senator from New Hampshire permit me to ask

him a question? He spoke of the liability of the Hawaiian Islands to be

captured by Spain as a penalty for violation of the neutrality laws. I

desire to ask the Senator from New Hampshire whether he regards that as

a practical or possible contingency?

Mr. CHANDLER. I do not regard it as a wise thing for us to subject

Hawaii justly and according to the rules of international law to capture

by Spain and simply say to the world “Well, we have destroyed the

neutrality of Hawaii, but no Spanish ship can get there.” The Senator

from Georgia will see that his case is gone the moment he admits that—

Mr. BACON. No.

Mr. CHANDLER. The moment he admits that we have destroyed the

neutrality of Hawaii, as we are already perhaps destroying it this very

day by our ships of war and our soldiers.

Mr. BACON. I do not admit that. I think the suggestion of the Senator

from Vermont fully answers that proposition, that we have a treaty by

which we can utilize Pearl Harbor without the destruction of neutrality;

and while our ships cannot get in there, it is entirely practicable, by

lighters and otherwise, to put coal in there and take it out for our ships.

Mr. CHANDLER. I admit that, I say to the Senator from Ga. as I said to

the Senator from La., if the coal was there and there was a channel. I am

dealing with facts as they are with reference to the 20,000 troops who are

going there. I want to say that if Hawaii’s neutrality is violated, when

this war is over Hawaii will be liable, according to the principles which

we asserted in connection with the Geneva Award, to pay to Spain every

dollar of the damage done to her by the ships which took on coal and

received friendly treatment in the harbor of Honolulu.

Mr. TILLMAN. Will the Senator from N.H. allow me to ask him a

question?

Mr. CHANDLER. Certainly.

Mr. TILLMAN. Is there any usage in international law which requires a

country to declare its neutrality? Cannot Hawaii allow us to coal and

allow Spain to coal and not subject herself to any consequences! Has not

Hawaii actually declared neutrality in this war? Is not Hawaii lying there

praying to the U.S. please “come and swallow me and pay the

$4,000,000 you promised.”

Mr. CHANDLER. I do not see the pertinence of the remarks of the

Senator from S.C.

Mr. TILLMAN. The latter part may not be pertinent, but you do not

deny the first.

Mr. CHANDLER. Undoubtedly Hawaii wants to be annexed to the U.S.

We have a treaty—

Mr. TILLMAN. Which could not pass the Senate.

Mr. CHANDLER. But until she is annexed she is a neutral power and

she must preserve her neutrality or else she subjects herself to the

penalties which may come to a nation that does not observe the law of

neutrality.

Mr. SEWELL. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a question? Is it

not a fact that Hawaii has not declared neutrality up to this period?

Mr. CHANDLER. She has not.

Mr. SEWELL. And if we go there and coal, that act will probably

require her to give coal to Spain. Is it not also the fact that we have got

to coal there, we must coal there, and if we were prevented, we would

have to take the island by force of arms today in order to save our fleet

and our people. It is more a necessity than the Philippine Islands to this

country. Personally, while I will support the administration in anything

it does, I have been opposed to the Philippine Islands. I should have

been very glad if Dewey had gone over and gone on to the Hawaiian

Islands and raised the flag there, instead of staying in a country that will

inevitably require us to send there a large number of men and a very

large fleet and in the end get us into complications which we should

desire very much to avoid. But the main fact stares us in the face today

that we cannot get to the Philippine Islands without coaling at the

Hawaiian Islands, and we must coal there no matter what it costs the

country.

Mr. TILLMAN. If the Senator from N.H. will permit me, is there

anything to prevent the President ordering Dewey to let go of Manila and

come away now.

Mr. SEWELL. I do not know of any reason—

Mr. TILLMAN. Nobody here wants to. God knows I do not. I want to

take them and hold them until the war is over and we get an indemnity or

else continue to hold them.

Mr. FORAKER. Will the Senator from N.H. allow me to ask him a

question? The question I desire to ask is whether or not the 12,000 tons

of coal spoken are in Pearl Harbor or Honolulu.

Mr. CHANDLER. They are at Honolulu.

Mr. FORAKER. They are at Honolulu. So by going into Pearl Harbor,

if that were possible, we could not get any coal upon the facts as they

now stand. It does not obviate the necessity for violating neutrality to

say we have 12,000 tons of coal at Honolulu, for that is a harbor in which

we have to right to enter in time of war for that purpose.

Mr. CHANDLER. I have already stated that if we have the coal there, as

we have wisely provided by the forethought of the Secretary of the Navy,

Hawaii, if she remains neutral, has no business to let our ships take it to

go on to Manila with on an expedition hostile to Spain. She would have

a perfect right to allow the coal to be taken by our ships if they would do

as the Senator from South Carolina suggests might be done, turn about

from the Sandwich Islands and come home again, but she renders herself

liable to Spain. She is making war in our behalf against Spain when she

allows the coal to be taken by our ships that are now upon the waters.

Mr. TILLMAN. Does not the Senator from New Hampshire think we

can defend her from any consequences after the war is over?

Mr. CHANDLER. If we do we ought to say so now. I am not

contending that the passage of this resolution or the ratification of the

treaty is the only thing we can do. We might make a temporary treaty.

We might take military possession of the islands, notifying the Hawaiian

government that we should protect her from any of the consequences of

that act. We might do that, but I say it is cowardly on our part, cowardly

treatment of the little republic, to leave her in the condition in which she

now finds herself while we are pottering away as to whether or not we

will put a stamp tax or a beer tax or a corporation tax upon the people of

this country to pay the expense of this war, which expense could easily

be paid by borrowing money I say it is unworthy of the United States to

leave this question in doubt; and in closing I take occasion—

Mr. DANIEL. How is Hawaii suffering in any way?

Mr. CHANDLER. Hawaii from that time forward becomes an enemy of

Spain, subject for a hundred years to just Spanish attack, because of our

act. I say I do not undertake to demand that we shall annex the islands,

although I think that is the proper course, but I do say that the President

of the United States with the Senate, which is composed of his

constitutional adviser, ought to know what we think he ought to do, and

we ought not to stand here saying it is a little petty question, that it makes

no difference. I know General Merritt is likely to take possession of the

islands when he gets there. I know that if the distinguished soldier, the

Senator from New Jersey (Mr. SEWELL), who says he has been against

the acquisition of the Philippine Islands up to this time, were major

general in command of the forces going to the Philippine Islands, to be

its military governor, he would take possession in the name of the United

States of the Hawaiian Islands when this troops got there and put the

United States flag upon those islands.

Mr. TILLMAN. Will the Senator allow me.

Mr. CHANDLER. I would rather finish and let the Senator from South

Carolina take the floor.

Mr. TILLMAN. It is only a question relevant to the point the Senator is

now making. Do you not believe that the expedition which left San

Francisco several days ago has already seized or will, when it reaches

Honolulu, seize the islands?

Mr. CHANDLER. I do not believe that you can keep those soldiers on

board their ships. I think they will get off and stretch—

Mr. TILLMAN. Will they not get off by permission of their officers?

Mr. CHANDLER. By permission of their officers and stretch their legs

upon Hawaiian territory and probably do it with the permission of the

Hawaiian government, but I say that within a week from this time the

United States by its act will have destroyed the neutrality of the

Hawaiian Islands, and it belongs to us, the Senate and the President of

the United States and the House of Representatives, to take up at once

the question of what protection we will give Hawaii for this position of

hostility to Spain in which it is proposed to force her. It is not a petty

question and it is not a future question. It is an immediate question.

Mr. ELKINS. Mr. President, I think if we had allowed the Senator from

Massachusetts (Mr. LODGE) to proceed we would have been on the

revenue bill now. That is the practical way to look at it. I do not think

any harm would have been done, especially when so able and self

restrained a Senator speaks to the country and the Senate. All this is for

nothing. It is not practical. I am for the Hawaiian Islands. I am willing

to discuss the matter in the Senate with closed or open doors, but we are

getting so tender about how we shall speak here and such solicitude is

manifested that I think we are violating the traditions of the Senate. I for

one wanted to get to the Senate in order to be in one place where I could

talk as long as I pleased and about anything I pleased.

Mr. FRYE. The Senator has got there.

Mr. ELKINS. I am here now, but it took a long time.

But it seems that rules are sometimes invoked which new members

cannot quite understand. I do not for my part. We are pressed to go on

with business, and that is given as a reason why we should not talk.

I think this motion emanated from the Senator from Ind. (Mr. TURPIE),

who is a member of the committee. Where is the line is to be drawn

when Senators say “do not criticise the war”; that we are not to have

freedom of discussion about the war or to say anything about the results

of the war? Let us see how this debate was opened by the Senator from

Ind:

The policy of this administration with respect to the war remains yet in

the mystery of abeyance.

I do not know what that means.

The mystery of abeyance!

That is in the speech of the Senator from Ind. The Senator then went on

and said that the Senator from Minn., chairman of the Committee on

Foreign Relations, had promised that Cuba should be recognized, and he

wanted to have it recognized right then and there. I do not want to do the

Senator from Ind. any injustice; that is far from me, but he would not

allow the Senator from Maine who is agreeing with him now to interrupt

him or talk about Cuba. He wanted himself to talk about Cuba.

Mr. TURPIE. Mr. President, that promise must be kept. It must be kept

to the hope, not only to the ear. It must be kept in deed, in verity, in

truth, in fact. Intervention has come. It is now flagrant. Where is the

promise? Where is the recognition of independence? Where is the sign

of its coming?

The Senator from Maine (Mr. HALE) said: Where is the Cuban

government?

That was discussing the results of the war. Which is the more flagrant,

which is the more violative of the rule now invoked here in the Senate, a

discussion of the Hawaiian question or of the Cuban question.

Mr. MORGAN. Was that on this bill?

Mr. ELKINS. It was on the 18th of May. Yes, sir, it was on the revenue

bill. It attracted my attention, but inasmuch as I know nothing about the

rules of the Senate and am always guided or led or controlled by the

Committee on Finance or any other committee having charge of a bill I

kept still. But that is not all.

If we go down there and take possession of Cuba and hold it for future

disposition, we take it as conquerors subject to the debt charged upon the

island.

What is the limit of discussion? That is bad law, to begin with. It is very

offensive from that standpoint. We are going to take the Island of Cuba,

I will tell the Senator from Ind., and not pay any debts to anybody or for

anybody, not to the Cuban Junta in New York either, and we are going to

keep the island, I hope we will, and I wish I had an opportunity of saying

this in open session.

Mr. GEAR. We said we would not keep it.

Mr. ELKINS. I know we did, but we did not mean it—not one of us.

Two or three meant it.

Mr. GEAR. It was a lie.

Mr. ELKINS. I do not know whether the Senate understands such

language.

Let us go a little further with the Senator from Ind., inasmuch as he made

this motion. I do not think my friend, the Senator from Mass. has

crucified all the rules of the Senate at one stroke.

Mr. President, we shall put our trust in the God of battles, that out of this

feebleness, this delay and infirmity.

What feebleness and what delay? Does he mean the administration in

the conduct of war? Does he mean the administration in the conduct of

the war? I do not know that my friend the Senator from Mass. was

criticising the administration. Some people were afraid he would. I saw

him at the White House in earnest conversation with the President. I do

not think he meant to criticise the administration. But I have never

known nor could understand—

Mr. LODGE. On the contrary, I said its policy was entirely admirable.

Mr. ELKINS. The Senator from Ind. proceeded: His omnipotent hand

will work great gain to the cause of liberty.

These are results. He wants to take the Omnipotent into partnership with

the Senator and the Senate.

A larger room for the feet of freeman, a manifest and final delivery from

the system of monarchical oppression and despotism wherever it obtains,

and especially in the heretofore Spanish islands of the Mediterranean of

the West.

That is the Philippines.

Mr. TILLMAN. The Mediterranean of the West!

Mr. DAVIS. The Gulf of Mexico.

Mr. ELKINS. The Gulf of Mexico, perhaps.

I have not misrepresented the Senator at all because I have read his

language. Why should the distinguished Senator from Ind. have this

wide liberty and the members of the committee—and he is one of the

members—to say what they pleases and then move a secret session when

another Senator arises in his place and offers some criticisms and some

expressions of opinion about the war and about the results of the war and

about the Philippines and about the Sandwich Islands. I cannot

understand it. Why was freedom of the widest latitude granted to the one

Senator and why should it be denied to another?

I favor going on with the bill and I want to go on with it, but it is just as

well that we should understand where we are and what we are doing and

what are the rules that govern the discussion of public measures, here,

especially revenue bills. I know the impatience of the overworked and

hard-worked committee, but let us have the facts stated just as they are.

The distinguished Senator from Indiana is on the committee. Now if that

is not just as broad a discussion, perhaps broader than my friend the

Senator from Massachusetts would have indulged in, then I am mistaken.

I hope we will go on with the bill. I hope we will simply on the motion

of someone who understands the rules and knows what to do go out of

secret session and proceed with the bill, because I want to discuss the

corporation tax.

I want something to say on this subject, and I am just as earnest and as

frantic for Hawaii and the Philippines and Cuba and Puerto Rico as the

Senator from Indiana and the Senator from Mass.

Mr. PETTIGREW. Mr. President, I just wish to call attention to one fact

in reply to the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CHANDLER). The

distance from San Francisco to Honolulu is 2100 miles. The distance

from San Francisco to Unalaska is 2100 miles. The distance from

Unalaska to Manila is 4160 miles and from Honolulu to Manila it is 4917

miles. Now, we have a splendid harbor at Unalaska. Every ship can go

there and coal in our own territory in a harbor that will hold all the

vessels of our Navy, and they can sail right in. Why are there not ten

thousand to twelve thousand tons of coal there eight hundred miles

nearer Manila than at Honolulu in a foreign territory? Why bring Hawaii

into this complication? Why embarrass that feeble republic, or

monarchy, or oligarchy, or whatever it is, with our presence? Why sail

eight hundred miles out of the way in order to relieve Dewey?

Why did we not sail straight there, coal in our own territory, sending our

coal vessels to Unalaska in advance to meet our fleet and save time two

or three days perhaps, precious time, in the relief of our ships in Manila.

For no other reason under heaven than to stimulate the prospects of

annexing the sugar plantations of Hawaii are we trifled with and our

interests jeopardized and our ships turned from their course.

Mr. ALLISON. Mr. President, one word.

Certainly no one knows better than I do, unless it is the Senior Senator

from Vermont (Mr. MORRILL), the absolute latitude of debate in this

Chamber, and certainly no committee and no Senator would undertake a

censorship over the Senate as respects the liberty of debate.

Now, in regard to the matter in hand, I perhaps ought to say a word or

two as a member of the Committee on Finance. It was no part of the

purpose of that committee to undertake to regulate the business of the

Senate as to whether this or that or the other topic should be taken up for

debate and consideration and action; but the Committee on Finance was

charged with the important duty of dealing with the bill that came to us

from the House of Representatives, one of magnitude and importance

and absolutely essential and necessary to the conduct of the war.

Senators, the bill came to us and since it has been under debate in the

Senate we have added or have had added to our expenditures

$75,000,000 annually.

When the Senator from Mass. introduced the amendment the other day I

became satisfied, from what came to me from others, that if we were to

include in the consideration of this bill the great question (because I

agree with the Senator from New Hampshire that it is a great question) of

the peaceable annexation of Hawaii as a part of the bill it would lead to

long debate, how long I do not know, and no man can tell. That is a

subject which ought to be considered by the Senate, and I have no doubt

that it will be considered. If it be true, as the Senator from Mass., has

said that a large majority of this body is in favor of annexing those

islands certainly the body will sustain itself.

But, Mr. President, we cannot do everything at the same moment. Here

is a bill of large detail, involving certainly $150,000,000 of taxation or

about that sum, and it may amount to much more. It came to us on the

second day of May. The Committee on Finance reported it back on the

12th day of May. It is now the 31st day of May. It does involve all the

expenditures and everything connected with this war, and it is necessary

that the bill shall pass at an early day. It may be necessary that other

measures shall pass at an early day but this bill involves largely increased

taxation; it involves a taxation upon objects and subjects which in the

nature of things it will be impossible to make it attach for from thirty to

sixty days. We double the tax upon malt liquors; we double the tax upon

tobacco; and we largely increase the taxation upon many other things. It

seems to be the sentiment of the Senate that we cannot attach this

taxation to the property that is in the hands of one hundred thousand or a

million people in the United States. Therefore, having taken up the bill it

seemed to the committee, as it seems to me, that it is important that we

should take this measure in hand and deal with it, because it matters not

after all, in the by and large of this discussion and the conclusion of this

bill, whether it is $25,000,000 less or $25,000,000 more than

$150,000,000 raised by taxation. It is as certain as noon-day, and it is

apparent to every Senator upon this floor, that in some way and by some

other methods we must raise two or three hundred million dollars for the

fiscal year just approaching.

In raising this money and carrying on the war it is necessary that time

shall be given after this legislation is placed here, and therefore it

becomes of supreme importance, in my judgment, that we shall consider

this bill now that we have it here before we consider any other measure,

and that other measures should not be attached to this bill in order to

force those measures upon the bill, or else that we shall not raise the

money necessary to carry on the operations of the war.

Therefore, Mr. President, it was the conclusion of those who were

present on yesterday in the committee, knowing as we knew and

knowing as every Senator knows that a debate on the annexation of

Hawaii will take two or three weeks, or a week at least speaking.

Mr. WHITE and OTHERS. It will take a great deal more time.

Mr. ALLISON. Senators all about me say it will take a great deal more

time. In view of that fact, inasmuch as those who were opposed to the

annexation of Hawaii had had no opportunity of public debate, and that

there must be a large opportunity of public debate for those who were

opposed to the annexation, we considered that it was wiser and better

that we should submit to the Senate the question whether we are to delay

this bill until all the questions that are to arise out of the war shall be

attached and placed upon it. I know, as Senators in this chamber know,

that if we give our attention to the consideration of the tax features and to

the revenue features of the bill, which relate to the borrowing of money

or to the issuing of money, on Thursday of this week, if not on

Wednesday, by giving assiduous attention to it, we can intelligently

consider it and pass it from our desks here to the other House, and then

the majority of the Senate can take up any other question that it chooses

to take up and deal with it intelligently and separately. If the exigency is

as the Senator from N.H. says, in the nature of things, the majority will

take up this question and deal with it, but why shall we place upon this

revenue measure all these outside, collateral, and incidental questions?

They may be war measures, if you please, but why shall they be

considered now, in connection with the pending bill, when its early

passage is of supreme importance that if the bill shall pass within a week,

it cannot go into full force and execution for sixty days after its passage,

and in the meantime the revenues of our Government are being lost day

by day to the extent of perhaps a million dollars a day because of the

postponement.

It is for these reasons, Mr. President, that the Committee on Finance, not

a part of the committee but the whole committee, believe that it is wise,

if possible and if practicable, as respects the good sense of Senators,

without limiting debate and without curtailing the freedom of debate, that

we should deal with revenue questions only upon this bill, and not upon

all collateral questions that are connected with it as respects the war.

Certainly it is the farthest from me, as I believe it is the farthest from any

Senator upon the Committee on Finance, to curtail in the slightest degree

the independence of any Senator, and least of all the independence of the

distinguished Senator from Alabama (Mr. MORGAN), who is familiar

with all these topics, by and large, and who can discuss them intelligently

and for the information of the Senate.

Now, we are in executive session. I was not here when that occurred,

and therefore I do not know the occasion of it especially. But as we are

in secret session I hope that we can have some understanding that this

bill should go on and be debated as respects its details as Senators may

wish to debate it, and debate it as respects amendments that any Senator

wishes to offer, and that we shall see to it that the bill shall be finished in

two or three days. Then Senators will have an opportunity of bringing

forward the important questions which they say are so exigent now, and

which were reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations nearly

three weeks before this bill came to the Senate, and which were in the

Senate for twelve days when we were considering it, and yet there was

no opportunity to consider that question.

Mr. DAVIS. My friend must understand very well that these resolutions

were not considered because of the pendency of appropriate bills.

Mr. ALLISON. Very well.

Mr. DAVIS. Entirely so.

Mr. ALLISON. Very well; I am not criticising any committee. I am

very glad to have the Senator make that suggestion because it is very

true.

Mr. DAVIS. It is the fact.

Mr. ALLISON. But what I only plead for now is that we shall get this

bill out of the way, and I promise the Senator from Mass. that I shall

throw no obstacle in his way for a full consideration of any measure that

the Senate shall decide to take up or consider. But surely the means

whereby the war shall be carried on should be provided. Surely when

appropriations of money for the purpose of carrying on the Government

are proper and are ready to be brought before the Senate, they should be

considered. It seems to me, therefore, Mr. President, that we should have

some understanding, a friendly understanding, not a hostile

understanding, not seeking here and there to impede this or that measure,

but an understanding that we shall deal with the question that we have in

hand until it is disposed of, and then take up the other questions that are

important, if the Senate shall so decide.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, this side, at least the friends of

annexation of Hawaii, have been notified that certain gentlemen in the

Senate and certain gentlemen in the House intended to institute what we

claim to be a filibuster to prevent the consideration of that measure at

this session of Congress. I have been informed by a distinguished

Republican in this Chamber, who is a man of great influence and power,

that as soon as this revenue bill was passed and they had fixed up the

appropriation bills, Congress would adjourn, which meant, of course,

that there was to be no no day given for the consideration of any measure

relating to Hawaii. I received that information with great regret, not

because of my anxiety for the annexation of Hawaii as a measure of civil

policy but because of my conviction that it is an indispensable element in

the conduct of the war as it is now progressing. So those of us, the

Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. LODGE) and others, who desire the

annexation of Hawaii, thought it was proper to bring this subject to the

consideration of the Senate upon this bill because it was connected with

the subject of taxation.

As the Senator from Nevada (Mr. STEWART) suggested the amount of

taxation upon the people of the United States will be greatly enhanced if

we are compelled to conduct the war in the Philippines without including

Honolulu or Hawaii within the limits of our national power, either civil

or military. Other considerations have arisen to my mind in that

connection, some of which are as follows: If we succeed in the

Philippines in holding that country we have got to do it at a great expense

of life and health in that moist, hot climate, where the bubonic plague

prevails, where cholera prevails, where yellow fever prevails, where

small pox prevails, and all the terrible diseases to which humanity is

incident prevail. Many of the noble gentlemen who have gone out

bearing our flag in that country must come back home in a state of

terrible distress on account of their health.

Now, Mr. President, I would not refuse to these men a stopping place on

the salubrious islands of Hawaii. I would as soon shut the door upon my

children and tell them they had to starve to death or perish in the streets.

Claims of humanity towards those soldiers, claims of national duty,

require us to consider this question. The President of the United States, I

am informed, has got his mind made up that as a matter of military

necessity he is obliged to take those islands and intends to do it. I

applaud him for his humanity, and his courage, and for his feeling of

responsibility for the lives of our soldiers who have gone to the

Philippines already.

The question of economy of sending small ships to Honolulu with coal,

sailing ships and other craft, piling up resources of coal, refreshments,

supplies, medicines, and what not in Honolulu, is a question that I think

would address itself to the intelligence of this great Committee on

Finance, and that they would see at once, and ought to have seen before

now, that it was a proper thing to include some measure of power and

authority in favor of the President of the United States to take those

islands by annexation or to take them by military force, and that that

would be included in the item of expenses of the conduct of the war; and

a very great item it is.

Here then are the two features, economy in expenditures, and humanity

and duty towards our soldiers. No man can blind his eyes to these

considerations, or if he can, he need not suppose that there is a twenty

year old person in the United States fool enough not to see it.

Therefore, a duty rests upon us to act upon this matter. I consider that

there is no sanctity in the particular political garment that this committee

has cut out for us to act upon which prevents us from making reasonable

suggestions in respect of including within the purview of that bill

something that is so important and so indispensable. I will not stop to

argue this question. We have had here this evening a full example and

demonstration of the unwisdom of undertaking to break in by arbitrary

rules and take off the floor by closing the doors, men who never intended

to discuss the question of the annexation of Hawaii as a civil proposition,

who never intended to refer to it at all in any other way than as a part of

the military necessity connected with the conduct of the war. Hawaii

was not mentioned by the Senator from Mass. (Mr. LODGE). The

argument about Hawaii has been thrust in here by gentlemen who want

to prevent the annexation, and who have pledged themselves to this

country privately and publicly that they will prevent it if they can live

long enough to do it; it makes no difference what the results may be.

That is a general and a special filibuster against which, Mr. President, I

feel that I have got the right to make resistance if I can do it.

Now, about the consumption of time, we see that this question has been

forced up by shutting these doors upon the Senator from Mass., who

never intended to make any such observation and did not intend to

provoke anybody to bring it in here. But suppose he had intended to

discuss the Hawaiian question, are the gentlemen who oppose Hawaii so

intensely patriotic that they cannot hear the question suggested without

rising and taking the time that is necessary to pass a tax bill in discussing

that side issue?

We shrink from the question because we are afraid of provoking them

into debate. That is all of it. The majority of this body is in favor of the

annexation of Hawaii or else gentlemen have changed their opinions very

much in a very recent period of time. But the Senator from Mass. did not

bring up the question. He never intended to bring it up as a question of

civil policy but only as a matter relating to the necessities of the war; and

I do not know that he ever would have mentioned it.

So far as I am concerned, I am under the same condemnation and

prejudgment as the Senator from Mass. because I have had the temerity

to offer an amendment to this bill that I can demonstrate by the Supreme

Court reports of the United States is absolutely necessary as a part of the

measure. Because I had the temerity to bring forward an amendment of

that kind and suggested that at some time in the consideration of the bill I

would offer it, the decree was already prearranged against me that I was

required also to take my seat and the Senator from Ark. (Mr. JONES)

and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. TURPIE), who seem to sit in

judgment upon matters of this kind, decided that I was to be put down

whenever the question was brought up.

Now, Mr. President, I do not take those rebuffs just quite in the Christian

spirit of some of the meek minded and sweet souled men who are around

me. I have got quite too much of old Adam in me for that.

In 1895 the Committee on Foreign Relations made the following report:

The Committee on Foreign Relations (through Mr. Davis) to whom was

referred the bill (S. 1309) to provide by treaty or otherwise, recommend

the passage of said bill with the following amendments. That bill went

on the Calendar and here it is.

That whenever the United States shall acquire dominion over any foreign

country of place, by treaty of annexation or otherwise, the President of

the United States, may appoint a governor for the same and legislative

council, to consist of any number of persons not less than three nor more

than twenty-five, whose acts shall be subject to revision or repeal by

Congress; and, unless the treaty of annexation or cession shall otherwise

provide, said governor and council shall constitute and conduct a

provisional government for such country of place until Congress shall

otherwise provide by law.

What is the origin of that bill? Not the contemplation of the annexation

of Hawaii but to take care of the island of Navassa, which belonged to

citizens of Maryland, and which my friend from Maryland (Mr.

GORMAN) has very long engaged here in trying to have brought within

the protection of the United States, and also to take care of the Midway

Islands which have been duly and solemnly annexed to the United States

by the raising of our flag under the order of Mr. Bayard. That is the

second event in which it has occurred, and those islands belong to us.

The President of the United States has no authority to extent the civil

jurisdiction of the United States over those islands. The circuit court of

the United States for Maryland by some stretch of authority I do not

know what—I am not complaining of it; I think it was right to do it—

found a way to punish some people for murder committed on the Island

of Navassa as a part of the territory of the United States. Where is the

island of Navassa? South of Jamaica; south of Puerto Rico. How did we

get any right to the Island of Navassa? Some enterprising citizens of

Maryland went out there and found a valuable deposit of guano, and

thereupon they established a guano shipping factory and took several

hundred laborers upon that island or those islands; it is one island I

believe. Thereupon we passed an act of Congress authorizing those

people to occupy and hold that island, provided they would consent that

all of the guano taken from it should be shipped to the United States and

none of it to foreign countries. They consented. In virtue of that

assumption of sovereignty we sent our marshals down there, or some

captain of a ship caught up some people who had been engaged in

murder and brought them to Baltimore and they were tried and

condemned and executed under the laws of the United States. Yet the

President of the United States has no power to-day and never had any

power to extend the civil laws of the United States or any other laws of

the United States of the Island of Navassa.

My amendment was intended to cover cases like that. We are not

looking forward to Hawaii or to the Philippines or to Cuba or to Puerto

Rico. Supposed we had it here now and that those islands should pass

within the jurisdiction of the United States, how happy would be the

United States to know that their President had the right and the power

with the consent of Congress, to appoint a governor there, and that he

might assemble around him a legislative council to consist of not less

than three nor more than twenty-five to pass laws for that portion of the

territory that we were occupying?

In the amendment that I had the temerity to offer here I did not go quite

so far. I confined the jurisdiction and powers of the President of the

United States to the existence of a state of war; by which I meant, of

course, until peace should be concluded and proclaimed; for you all

remember that a state of war existed in my section of country in

Alabama, very long after the armies had been surrendered and disbanded,

and we were kept under the regimen of war there for years. It was a

necessary thing to be done; but it was done by an act of Congress. It was

not done by the President of the United States in virtue of his office. I

have got the decisions of the Supreme Court of the U.S. here to show that

he could not do it.

Now, you have got revenues coming from the Philippines, containing

8,000,000 people, with a large trade in sugar, Manila hemp, fruits, and

various other important matters in commerce; you have got Admiral

Dewey down there in charge of the bay, and he has established a

blockade. Do you not want to know something about what is to become

of those revenues? Do you not want to make some provision by which

the President of the U.S. would be authorized by Congress, and not by

the laws of nations—for he has to get his authority from one or the

other—authorized by Congress to do certain things which are required to

be done in order to handle that country there, even while we are in

occupation of it?

What money paid for the Soldiers Home out there—that beautiful park?

Revenues collected by General Scott while he was in the military

command in Mexico. After that war was over a fund was left in our

military treasury, which had to be disposed of, and we took it and we

applied it to the purchase of this beautiful tract of land out here. That

was Mexican money, won by war. It was taken in hand by Congress and

put into that beautiful park. We shall have possibly something like that

in the Philippines, and probably we shall have a good deal of it, for the

income of the government at Manila from importations alone is over

$13,000,000 a year—a large sum to neglect, too large a sum to pass over

in the sweet innocence of that committee that never thought about it, and

now refuse to think about it. It is a large sum.

When you get to Cuba what are you going to do, sir? We have been

receiving from Cuba $90,000,000 a year of her productions. It may not

be two years until she will get back to the point of production, when she

can again supply us with $90,000,000, after we get possession and

restore peace and order and that country is open to the migration of our

people, who will go there in swarms. What provision do you propose to

make in regard to that? None. You propose to leave it entirely in the

discretion of the President. If you do, his discretion is not broad enough,

for there are certain things which the Supreme Court of the United States

has decided he cannot do as commander in chief of the Army and Navy,

which are absolutely essential to be done. I am not going to point them

out just now, but I am going to do so in the open Senate. If you want to

close the doors upon me, then, all right, but I am going to debate that

question in the open Senate on the tax bill because it is a necessary part

of it.

There is another feature in this amendment of mine. When we get down

into Cuba we have got to use money in paying our troops, and in the

Philippines and in Puerto Rico, and if Hawaii should come in also as part

of our military possessions, we shall have to use money there to do that.

What kind of money are you going to use? You pay your soldiers who

are down there in the gold or in the silver or in the legal tender paper of

the United States. They are obliged to have money although they may be

six or seven thousand miles away from home. They will need it worse

than they do now. What are they going to do with it? You must have

some power, which has authority from the Congress of the United States,

to declare what shall be a legal tender for public and private debts,

contracts, and receipts. Are you going to put your soldiers down there at

the mercy of sharpers, tricksters, tradesmen, and Jews who want to shave

them to the bone upon their pay without the Congress of the United

States making the slightest effort to protect them?

We have not had a foreign war heretofore, except in Mexico, and we

have not made provision by law for these things. After the Mexican war

was over, through lawsuits and litigations which came to the Supreme

Court of the United States, it was developed that the Congress of the

United States had been extremely derelict in its duty in not making

provision for these things. I propose now to make provision in advance,

and I trust I am not trenching too much upon this political machine that is

here today in this bill, made for the November elections, when I

undertake to try to protect the soldiery, their lives, their health, and their

finances, and also to protect the Govmt. of the United States not merely

in the collection of revenues in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines,

but also in the regulation of trade between those countries and this.

There is more than that in the amendment. When we get to Cuba, we

find there three governments an autonomous government at present

under the Spanish Crown. Suppose they declare their independence, like

the Gomez part has done, then you have got the autonomous party there,

regularly organized, with laws and institutions of every kind, occupying

one end of the island, and the government of Maso, the republic,

occupying the other, and the Govmt. of the United States comes in with

what? Supreme military power. Anything else? There is nothing that

Congress has given to them. We go there and we exert supreme military

power over either or both of the two governments that we find there. Mr.

Prest., is it not the duty of the Congress of the United States to say that

the President of the United States when he occupies Cuba, for the

purpose of protecting the peace, the lives, and property of the Cubans—

for that is what my amendment says—may appoint a governor of Cuba,

civil or military, that he may do the same thing in Puerto Rico, in the

Philippines, and in Hawaii, if that should be taken by him as a military

necessity in the course of the progress of this war.

Can we discharge our duty to ourselves and keep posterity from holding

up a picture before us that would disgust us now if we could only look at

it in its outlines? Can we excuse ourselves from going a little further,

perhaps, than this committee has gone, and putting something in this bill

besides taxation of the people of the United States? We must provide for

taxing the people of Puerto Rico, of Cuba, of the Philippines, of Hawaii,

and if Hawaii shall come in as a military possession.

Mr. ALLEN. I should like to ask the Senator whether the President of

the United States has any authority to appoint a military governor

without legislation?

Mr. MORGAN. I do not think he has.

Mr. ALLEN. Would not that be the natural result of taking possession of

a country?

Mr. MORGAN. No, Mr. Prest., there are no natural results.

Mr. ALLEN. There I differ with the Senator.

Mr. MORGAN. The only results that are possible in this country are

results that come from law, because this is a law-abiding country, and

nothing in the nature of power exists in the United States which has not

got the sanction of law.

Mr. MONEY. Will the Senator permit me to ask him a question?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes.

Mr. MONEY. Has not the President, as commander in chief of the Army

and Navy of the United States, the right to appoint a military governor in

a town or city which has been conquered? Is not that the usage of the

Army of the United States?

Mr. MORGAN. Oh, yes, that is the usage.

Mr. MONEY. But is it not right?

Mr. MORGAN. No. That does not make it right. What the armies of

the United States have found it necessary to do in times of emergency,

they have done, but that does not create a right, nor does it create a

precedent, nor does it fix any feature of law, national or international.

No, sir, there is but one source which you can refer to at all for the

authority of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army, or any

of his subordinates to create law in any country that is in military

occupancy, except the laws of nations.

Mr. MONEY. If the Senator will permit me, when the city of Mexico

surrendered to the Army of the United States, Major General Quitman, of

Missi., was appointed military governor. It was impossible to have the

action of the President of the United States for weeks, and there was a

necessity of having a military governor, and he was appointed. So it was

with other cities which came into our hands.

Mr. MORGAN. They tried to establish an admiralty court in California,

and the Supreme Court decided that they could not do it. General

Kearney established a code of laws, with two hundred and ninety-odd

sections in it, in New Mexico, and I think followed it up in California.

General Quitman established a different code in the City of Mexico when

he was military governor there. Commander Sloan established a

different code, he being commander-in-chief of the Navy, but all these

things trace their authority back to what? To the laws of nations.

The laws of nations tolerate the despotic powers of this earth in

establishing in a conquered country what they please, but the laws of the

United States do not do that; and the Constitution of the United States is

as obligatory upon the President of the United States in the establishment

and creation of laws and courts and judicial establishments in a foreign

country as it is here at home. It is the duty of Congress to provide for

such a contingency, and if we do not do it, it is because we are either

delinquents or cowards.

Mr. ALLEN. But that was not the question I put to the Senator. The

question was this: That, having the power to conquer or having

conquered, is it not an incidental power of the commander-in-chief to

place a military governor over the conquered territory until a civil

government may be established?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, to put a civil government there until some other is

established.

Mr. ALLEN. No; that is not a logical sequence.

Mr. MORGAN. They are both true.

Mr. ALLEN. But the appointment of a military governor is the means of

accomplishing the object of the expedition.

Mr. MORGAN. And the appointment of a civil governor is just as legal

as that of a military governor. Both derive their authority under the law

of nations—remember that.

Mr. ALLEN. That is what I think.

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, that is right; but the question is, Shall the President

and the Army of the United States be governed by the laws of nations in

those countries, that we are going out, with our splendid banners, to

relieve with rejoicing and in the midst of arms, from the iniquities and

oppressions which Spain has put upon them—shall they go out under the

laws of nations or shall the Congress of the United States give to them

the powers and define their limits as they go?

Mr. SPOONER. Will the Senator allow me a moment?

Mr. MORGAN. I will.

Mr. SPOONER. I do not rise to interrupt the Senator or to debate with

him, but I did not hear his answer to the question put to him by the

Senator from Neb. (Mr. ALLEN), if such appointments are within the

power of the President.

Mr. MORGAN. I will say that under the laws of nations the conqueror

has the right to prescribe a military or a civil governor to be conquered;

and there is no restraint upon him except his own will.

Mr. SPOONER. The Senator does not deny the power of the President

to appoint a military governor at the Philippines?

Mr. MORGAN. I do not, but I say the President of the United States has

not got in his exclusive control and grasp one shred of prerogative

power—not one shred. When we left Great Britain we took all the

prerogatives of the crown and divided them up amongst different

tribunals here, legislative and otherwise. The President of the Untied

States has got no shred of prerogative. All such powers belong to him as

Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, and those powers the

Supreme Court say are limited to the function of making war. He cannot

even make peace.

Mr. BACON. Will the Senator permit me?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes.

Mr. BACON. I desire to know under what constitutional power the

Senator places the alleged power, which he says today he applauds in the

President of the United States to seize the territory of a neutral nation if it

becomes a military necessity—a neutral nation, not a nation with which

we are at war—

Mr. MORGAN. I understand.

Mr. BACON. Seeing that the Executive only has such powers as are

given in the Constitution, I want to know under what clause of the

Constitution the Senator finds the power to seize the territory of a neutral

nation, one with which we are not at war?

Mr. MORGAN. I will bring that question up, and will give a sound

answer on it from the decisions of the Supreme Court, but just now I am

on the skirmish line. I am not fighting any legal battles before the

Senate. I am trying to excuse and exonerate myself from the necessity of

having to intrude upon the committee some ideas they never have

thought about, and which are absolutely necessary for properly providing

for the situation and which belong to this bill. That is what I am trying to

do.

Mr. ALLEN. I do not desire to interrupt the Senator needlessly, but I

want to understand his position. I infer the Senator means that Congress

shall legislate and establish a civil government over territory before it is

conquered and that that legislation may be carried into execution when

the country is reduced by force of our arms?

Mr. MORGAN. What I mean is, the President having no prerogative

powers, but deriving his powers from the law, that Congress shall enact a

law to enable him to do it, and not leave it to his unbridled will and

judgment.

Mr. ALLEN. Would it not be just as wise, then, to provide a code of

laws for the government of a neutral territory in anticipation that within

five or six months we might declare war against that power and reduce

its territory?

Mr. MORGAN. I am not discussing the wisdom of that.

Mr. ALLEN. Would it not be exceptional because we have never before

had a foreign war like this, or anything approximating to it. All I am

contending for at this time, and all I intend to contend for at any time, is

that the President of the United States shall have the powers conferred

upon him by Congress full and ample, but that he shall understand that

they come from Congress and do not come from his prerogative, or

whatever his powers may be merely as the fighting agent of the United

States, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United

States.

Mr. ALLEN. That would arise from his constitutional powers as

Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy.

Mr. MORGAN. No; his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief

of the Army and the Navy are not defined in that instrument. When he is

in foreign countries he draws his powers from the laws of nations, but

when he is at home fighting rebels or Indians, or the like of that, he

draws them from the laws of the United States, for the enabling power

comes from Congress, and without it he cannot turn a wheel.

These things, Mr. President, are not new except that we have not thought

about considering them. They are all here in the Supreme Court Reports,

and I will read them to the Senate, and I will convince the Senate that I

am right about it, and that the necessity is absolutely imperious and

unavoidable upon our part not to lay our duty down and to leave the

President in a strait, where he will have a thousand difficulties to contend

with. We are obliged to provide something of this kind, and the

Committee on Foreign Relations so thought years ago, and in 1893,

reported a bill for it. If that bill were a law today, there would be no

trouble in the case. We have neglected our duty, and now we have come

to appoint where it is necessary that we should perform it, and I want to

perform it understandingly. It may break up the little political

gerrymander that is fixed up in this bill, and that is to be fixed up for the

November elections, I want us to do our duty, notwithstanding the

committee’s great efforts to confine us to the particular issues contained

in this bill.

Mr. President, Congress seems to be afraid of everything and everybody.

The House of Representatives seems to be afraid of somebody whom I

do not dare to mention, because it would be unparliamentary. They sit

there and shiver in apprehension and alarm until they want to keep out of

sight of the world and of the people. The people will keep a great many

of them out of sight, I am afraid. And the Senate of the United States is

alarmed to death at a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States

that stood for months affirming a hundred years of decisions and then, by

the change of the opinion of a single man on the bench took the other

turn, and we are in such a state of alarm about it that we cannot consider

that there is any possibility of that decision being reversed, and the

Senate will not stop to consider whether that decision covers the case

presented in this bill or not. We are so scared that we will not stop even

to look back to find out whether we are on safe ground. The decision of

the Supreme Court—I do not say properly construed, but when looked at

and read by the simplest minded man who can read an opinion and

understand it—does not cover numbers of things that are shut out in this

bill and numbers of things that are included in it. We are in a state of

alarm; we run off from our duty and refuse to consider it, and allow the

country to go–, well, to the devil. That is exactly where we are drifting

by reason of fear and alarm. It seems as if we are afraid to land a soldier

in the Island of Cuba lest some Spaniard should come along and eat him

up before he could get behind a tree, or bush, or something. Alarm

attends everything. It is all inaction; it is all supineness; all dread. If the

Spanish had the enterprise that they ought to have, they would come here

and lick us before we could get waked up and understand that we had

manhood enough to defend our country and take care of our lives.

I am not reproaching any person about this any more than I am myself,

and I include myself in the category with my brethren here. That is the

situation of all of us. The Republican party, when they came to pass the

Dingley bill, were so alarmed at the people that they would not repeal

those thirteen sections in the Wilson law, but they repealed every other

section of the Wilson law but those thirteen, which cover the income tax,

and left them standing, and they are the law today so far as Congress can

make law.

I propose to get out of this shuddering attitude and that we should, like a

band of good, honest, square Americans, come up to our duty and

consider any question that any Senator presents here in good faith, and

see whether or not the arguments he has got to produce are worthy of

consideration. There is not any breakneck haste about this bill any way.

We are not suffering for money, so far as I have been able to hear, and

we are liable to get any amount. If you put your printing press to work

and print greenbacks to the amount of $500,000,000, you will have as

much money in this country as you can pack on miles, and it will be as

good as any that is here now. There is no trouble about money.

Here is a controversy which the national banks are making for the

purpose of controlling $500,000,000 in the form of bonds, and another

$100,000,000 in the shape of interest-bearing Treasury notes, which they

know will go into that sink—every one of them. They are playing for

that; that is the game they are playing, and the committee is helping them

out all it knows how. There is nothing left undone here to help the

national banks get the control of this money, and then using it for the

purposes of getting out of the people interest and usury to the amount of

at least from 8 to 16 per cent. Per annum, when we could just as well put

out the money to the people and pay the soldiers with it, without paying

any interest at all.

These things are not misunderstood by the people of the United States.

They are perfectly aware of the condition; and when I speak of it in the

Senate, I only speak what all the country knows. The country is

perfectly aware of it. This little game of hide and seek, that is going on

amongst the politicians, leaders and rules, the chairmen of Congressional

committees and the chairmen of the political committees—this little

game of hide and seek, playing around here for advantage, is something

that the people do not misunderstand. Then gentlemen get alarmed about

our bringing in something that is really of value. I am not myself very

much stirred up about it. I intend to pursue on this bill the course I

esteem to be right. I am for every Democratic measure on this bill, and I

know them as well as I know my right hand from my left. They all meet

my approval—every one of them—and I intend to vote for them. When

it comes to a political question, and they are all voted down, as I know

they will be, and you know it, too—for every one of them will be voted

down—when it comes to the proposition of taking the House bill in the

shape that the Republican majority on that committee ask us to take it, or

the Republicans on that committee want us to take it, then the question

will be about voting for it. I do not intend to cast a vote while this war is

going on that denies to the party in power the right to conduct it, even to

the extent of supplying the finances of it—that being the bottom fact in

the whole case. There is no use of providing soldiers if you do not

provide finances.

So far as the annexation of Hawaii is concerned, those who want to

oppose it have a perfect right to do so. I understand the Senator from

Cal. (Mr. WHITE) who is the chairman of the Democratic Congressional

committee, and the Senator from Ark. (Mr. JONES), who is the chairman

of the National Democratic committee, are both opposed to the

annexation of Hawaii. Whether you take it as a war measure or take it

otherwise, they are utterly opposed to it. I do not expect to correct their

opinions nor to reproach them for holding them. I only say to those two

gentlemen, who occupy the most distinguished positions in the

Democratic party, that they cannot make that opposition Democratic.

They cannot do that, and then go back to the old Marcy platform on these

questions. They must stand on stronger ground than they did when they

stood by Grover Cleveland when he tried to keep Liliuokalani on the

Hawaiian throne.

When you object to the Democracy of those who are in favor of the

annexation of Hawaii on this side of the Chamber, we have as much

claim to Democracy as any of the balance of you, and we will assert it

whenever you put up a man for the Presidency of the United States who

says he is against all progress, against all justice, against all treaty

obligations, and against doing those things which are necessary for

carrying on this war. When you come to put him in the Presidential chair

you will find yourselves mistaken and encounter a power you do not

dream of. There are men still alive in this world who have the old

Jackson stock in them, and plenty of it, and the Marcy stock, too.

Mr. CHANDLER. May I ask the Senator whether he is talking to the

Republican party or to the Democratic party?

Mr. MORGAN. I certainly am not talking to the Senator from N.H., for

of late I do not know whether he is a Democrat or a Republican.

Mr. CHANDLER. Because I do not know myself. [Laughter.]

Mr. MORGAN. I am satisfied you do not, and the misfortune is that the

Senator from N.H. will not live to be old enough to find himself out, or if

he should ever do that, he would be as old as Methuselah.

Mr. CHANDLER. But I do want to find out what the Senator from Ala.

means when he is taking so eloquently.

Mr. MORGAN. There is nobody but the Senator from N.H. in the

Senate who misunderstands me—nobody else. These gentlemen I have

been talking to do not misunderstand me. The people are not going to

misunderstand me, and I do not feel like I was putting myself out of

harness or in any particular predicament by telling the truth about these

things as I go along here—the truth no Democrat was ever afraid of in

the affairs of this Govt. and in the reference to the men who manage

them.

Now I have got through with what I had to say on this subject for the

afternoon, but I am going to discuss it and in discussing it if I mention

the name of the Hawaiian Islands I hope the chairman of the committee

or the Senator in charge of the bill will not lock the doors on me because

of that fact. It will not be intentional and I might accidentally stumble on

it.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, I regret that the Senator from Iowa

suggested that this bill was not intended as a subject for general debate.

If it had been a bill for speedy action it would have been an ordinary

revenue bill. In the history of this Govt. previous to the civil war and

during that time the method of raising money for like emergencies was to

issue short time Treasury notes.

Mr. ALLISON. I will say, in order to save the Senator any further time

on that question, that what I said was quite to the contrary, that it was a

subject of the wildest debate.

Mr. STEWART. I think the putting into this bill of the whole money

question was unfortunate. You could raise money as you have in all time

past, by Treasury notes drawing interest. It gave an abundance in the

Mexican war, and in the war of 1812 there was no trouble. But here is

something else wanted. There is a contest whether it shall be bank or

Govt. money, and they must under any and all circumstances have a

large issue of three per cent bonds to be taken by the banks, and the

banks are here asking for this thing. The whole money question is

involved in this. If you put out these bonds and strengthen the banks,

then of course that gives the gold power an additional weapon. That is

what they are fighting for. Every recommendation coming from the bank

party from Gage up and down—true, it is but a little ways down—has

advocated bonds, bonds, bonds. We have heard nothing else but bonds

to be taken by the banks. That is what this for. Nobody believes that this

is a mere war measure to raise revenue, because if it were it would have

done it in the regular way. The majority of the committee have adopted

the principles of the war measure of thirty years ago.

Then there is another peculiarity of which I hardly want to speak in

public. We are called copperheads and traitors because we do not like

the bond issue, and particularly the majority of the committee are called

all sorts of names too horrible to mention for suggesting greenbacks.

The Republican prayers are full of it, loaded down—copperheads,

traitors, sneaks, and such terms.

Mr. HAWLEY. It is the first time I have ever heard such an expression

used.

Mr. STEWART. In the papers?

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, and I am somewhat of a newspaper man.

Mr. STEWART. I saw them this morning. I refer you to the

Indianapolis Journal, quoting from a whole lot of other papers the same

kind of language.

That reminds me of what the Republican party said of the Democrats

because they opposed greenbacks, because they opposed the exercise of

the power of the Govt. to issue greenbacks. They were denounced in

every possible way as we are now denounced, but, presto, change.

Mr. ALLEN. The language referred to was used in an editorial this

morning in the Post, copied from some other paper.

Mr. STEWART. In the Post and several other papers. Such papers are

sent to me from all points. For opposing greenbacks the Republicans for

twenty years denounced the Democrats as copperheads, and after the war

the Democrats took another step, that they could not issue legal tender

money, that the Government of the U.S. had no such power in time of

peace, and the Republican press went for them terrifically and said that it

was treason, because the time would come when they would want them

again and it was treason to deny to the Government this authority, and

the Republican party went so far—I was a member of it at the time and

know it—as to pack the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had

decided that the power did not exist to issue legal tender money in time

of peace. There were two vacancies and two men were appointed who

notoriously were in favor of that power of the Government. Their views

were well known in this Chamber. I am glad it is in secret session. The

Democrats said they packing the court. They replied they would pack

the court, that they had a right to do it to save the Government, to save

the power to the Government; that if the Government was deprived of the

power to issue legal tender money it was something with which the

Government could not dispense and exist. They did not deny the charge.

They said the exigency warranted it, that the President had a right to pick

out men of known views. He took two lawyers, Bradley and Strong.

That charge was made.

From 1862 to 1882, when Judge Gray rendered the last decision, the

Republican press denounced Democrats who questioned it. Now this

committee is arraigned by the same press for proposing to exercise a

function which the Supreme Court said the Government had a right to

exercise and which the Republican party contended for here was

essential to the existence of the Government.

Mr. WOLCOTT. I rise to a parliamentary inquiry. I have been away for

a time. I desire to ask what is the question before the Senate.

Mr. STEWART. I am discussing the question.

Mr. WOLCOTT. I ask for information.

The Presiding Officer (Mr. GALLINGER in the chair). The Senator

from Nevada will suspend. The chair will state that the parliamentary

question is, Shall the discussion which is being carried on by the Senator

from Massachusetts (Mr. LODGE) be proceeded with behind closed

doors. That is the only question.

Mr. WOLCOTT. Thank you.

Mr. STEWART. I will excuse my friend, the Senator from Colorado,

because his mind does not generally follow closely enough so that he can

understand the bearing of a legal argument. With his loose ideas he of

course gets bewildered.

Mr. LINDSEY. Mr. President—

The Presiding Officer (Mr. GALLINGER in the chair). Does the Senator

from Nevada yield to the Senator from Kentucky?

Mr. STEWART. No. I am replying to arguments which were made here

that this is a bill not to create discussion but purely to raise revenue. I

say it is a bill to transfer this Government to the banks. It is a bill to get

out bonds which could not be got out in any other way. They dare not

attempt it in any other way. They are taking advantage of the war. The

first thing is the issue of bonds. We have heard of this for years. We say

why not raise money as we have done in every other war? At all times

previous to 1860 it was raised by Treasury notes, payable in one or two

years, receivable for Government dues, and drawing interest. During the

war the first thing we did was to put out greenbacks. We say why not

follow the established precedent? Why start in on this new departure to

get bonds out before you require them and open the whole question, and

I tell my friends that if they want to cut people off in this way and take a

man off the floor there is enough questionable material in the bill that

needs discussion.

I do not take any stock in discussions to stop legitimate amendments. I

do not take any stock in any of the threats that if Hawaii is to be

considered there will be filibustering. I give the gentlemen notice that

filibustering can occur, not filibustering, but legitimate argument. The

money question is a big one and involves a great deal of argument.

There may be a large amount of legitimate argument made and probably

there will be more made than otherwise if we did not hear the threats of

filibustering. They say that you shall not discuss at all the question of

having this way-station, because if you do somebody will filibuster. Is

that the way you are going to get bills through?

My friend the Senator from Ala. (Mr. MORGAN) does not filibuster, but

he has a capacity for argument in extenso, and he does not talk nonsense.

He talks sense all the time. He illuminates a question. He may have

some remarks to make, and he will have some remarks to make if you

have no other game than that of talk. He can talk with argument and that

beats talking without argument which his opponents must necessarily be

driven to if they attempt to filibuster against the annexation of the

Sandwich Islands in this emergency.

We had better go on without threats. We had better go on without the

pretense that here is a bill which has no debatable matter in it, a bill that

patriotism ought to put through. I say it is a bill the banking green wants.

The mode of raising money is unusual and never was resorted to before

in the history of the Govt. under like circumstances. Every time we have

got into war Treasury notes were issued, starting with Madison, and

during the war they were resorted to first and bonds were the last resort.

They kept them out. There were very few long time bonds out when the

war closed. The bonding scheme was invented since the war. It was

invented to improve the credit of the Government; to get it bonded so

that it could not pay. Look at how the bond scheme has operated. In the

five years preceding the repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman

$112,000,000 was paid off annually. At the same rate the whole debt

would have been paid six months ago. But they started in with this nonpartisan

scheme to strengthen the public credit, to bring prosperity in a

moment. You have passed it. You have added $60,000,000 a year to the

public debt since, making more grievous taxation. Now you have nearly

$900,000,000. That is the way you raise revenue and strengthen the

public credit. You put into all of your legislation some game of that kind

to rob the people, and if Senators can be taken off the floor on the ground

that if they talk they are going to prolong debate, I merely make these

suggestions to show that there are elements of debate sufficiently

involved in the bill.

I hope the doors will be opened and that the Senator from Mass. will

conclude his speech. It is a shorter road to the final result than any other

you can adopt, and I give you notice of that right now.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, those of us who are opposed to the

annexation of the Hawaiian Islands are not opposed to an open debate

upon that topic; in fact we have courted it from the beginning, but we

object to an ex parte debate participated in by the other side. Perhaps we

would not be so liberal if we constituted the ex parte element. However

that may be, it is the fair thing, if we are to discuss it at all to discuss it in

open session or in secret session exclusively. Those of us who are

opposed to annexation as I have remarked prefer discussing it in the

open. We think there are a great many fallacious notions prevailing

about the subject which could be readily cleared up by open discussion.

We cannot be driven very much. We have not heretofore responded to

anybody’s lash and we do not propose to do so here. The comments of

my friend, the Senator from Alabama, in reference to myself of course

will be respectfully considered, as I have regard for his opinions upon

any subject, as I ought to have, but I certainly will express my own views

and intend to adhere to them until I am shown that I am wrong, and I will

not be deterred from expressing them by any remarks he made with

reference to them outside of the actual argument which may be suggested

showing that I am wrong.

Now, so far as the pending bill is concerned, those of us who are opposed

to annexation have not filibustered. We have not attempted to impede its

passage at all. We have endeavored to disentangle it from everything

outside of the matters legitimately and properly appertaining to it, and in

the Finance Committee there has been no dissent as to the policy to be

pursued in this regard. On the contrary it has been understood by the

members of the committee that Congress was here mainly because of the

necessities of the war and that the probabilities are we would have been

at our homes to-day had not war come upon us. We are endeavoring to

pass this bill to obtain the revenues necessary for the Government, and

those who are attaching other measures to it are to blame if the revenue

bill does not pass.

Another thing. It must be remembered that the appropriation bills are in

a very sad condition. People in my State, in certain portions of it

especially, are agitated about the non-appearance of the sundry civil bill

which has been in conference for a long time because the distinguished

chairman of the Committee on Appropriations has had a great deal to do,

more than anybody else, I may say, in connection with the present

revenue bill, and he could not do two things at one time and a thousand

things all at once. So in regard to the Indian appropriation bill. It is also

in conference. These are great leading measures.

As to the schemes of annexation, whether they be of the 1,200 Philippine

Islands and of the seven millions of oriental combination products

contained there or regarding islands in the West Indies, I know not, but

one thing we are certain of: When we reach out and annex 1,200 islands

upon the shores of China, tenanted by six or seven million barbarians, six

thousand and odd miles from our coast, we will think about it a little, I

imagine, and discuss it, I trust. When we talk about annexing an island

in the Caribbean Sea or in the Atlantic Ocean or elsewhere tenanted by

non-assimilative races, people who have no knowledge of our institutions

or capacity of acquiring any knowledge, I hope we will think a little bit

about it. It seems to me it is worth considering a little. It should not be

put as a rider upon a bill nor passed during the heat of summer. The

Hawaiian question is only one of those foreign questions now before. It

must be solved in the light of the experiences and obligations imposed

upon us by the present war. What will they be? Who knows? I do not.

Does any Senator know? I imagine not.

Mr. President, therefore I think it is not unreasonable if some of us

believe that this great question of annexation of territory ought to be

postponed until the war is over and we know what we have on hand.

This talk about foreign interference with us because we shall want to

coal, if we do so, at Honolulu has nothing to support it. The charge made

in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations regarding Japan was

absolutely without foundation. I have investigated the matter myself

sufficiently to make me feel absolutely confident of this assertion, and I

defy anybody to produce any proof that France or Germany or any other

power is protesting against our getting coal at Honolulu. It is a mere

announcement of those who are trying to get up a scare in order to make

men do that which under ordinary conditions they would not do.

We will, I suppose, go on with this war as we see fit. We are not asking

Spain’s permission to coal in Honolulu, and the Senator from N.H. (Mr.

CHANDLER) who is afraid that Spain may feel hard towards the

Hawaiian govt. if we coal at Honolulu certainly feel more towards Spain

in that regard than in other. We are not asking anything of Spain. If we

do something in the Hawaiian Islands which Spain does not like and

Spain makes a fuss about it, we will chase her around the Hawaiian

Islands as we are trying to chase her in other places, and with more

success I hope than we have done recently.

Mr. CULLOM. We have got them in a pen.

Mr. WHITE. If it be true that they are penned up we will endeavor to

apply the Cervera trick, so-called, upon them in Honolulu. Certainly at

all events we do not intend to and we will not consult Spain about

anything. I think we have severed diplomatic relations with Spain,

although the President informed us that Spain had no reason to feel

aggrieved at what we had done, and he was no doubt right about that

matter. Still we did sever diplomatic relations with her and we are not

consulting her in any regard, and my friend, the Senator from N.H. is the

last man to consult Spain, unless he changes tactics entirely, and

whatever may be said about him in connection with other subjects, I do

not think there will be any alteration of his course in this regard. He is

always very consistent.

Mr. CHANDLER. What I said was that if we destroyed the neutrality of

Hawaii Spain would have a claim against Hawaii which she could

enforce according to the principles of the Geneva Award and make

Hawaii, if she were able to do it, pay for every dollar’s worth of damage

done to the ships of property of Spain by the fleet that may go out of

Hawaii.

Mr. WHITE. I do not think my friend, the Senator from N.H. is very

much disturbed about that. As far as the Geneva Award is concerned

that was decided upon agreed principles laid down in certain rules which

I believe that all of the writers upon international jurisprudence agree

were not the rules of international law, but we won our case for, I believe

the first and only time in history, by outwitting Great Britain—

Mr. CHANDLER. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a question?

First, whether he is willing to have the Navy and Army of the U.S.

violate the neutrality of Hawaii?

Mr. WHITE. I am not, as everybody knows, a soldier, nor am I familiar

with military affairs, but if I were conducting this Govt. and fighting

Spain I would proceed so far as Spain was concerned just as I saw fit. I

would get the better of her in any way I deemed proper, without

trenching upon the rights of other people. So far as the Hawaiian Islands

are concerned, we talk about a coaling station. We have had one, and

because we have not improved it we are told that we ought to go and

annex the islands. There is an argument for you! Then why have we

not, if we need a coaling station in the Hawaiian Islands now, if we have

needed it so badly as the Senator states, had a treaty to give us one in

Honolulu Harbor before the war began? Mr. Dole would be very willing

to enter into any kind of treaty with us. But the matter has been held up

for the purpose of attempting to create a necessity, and we are asked in

the presence of necessity to do that which a sane man under ordinary

circumstances would not think of doing, this to establish a precedent in

order to enable our speculative friends in various parts of the world to

argue that we ought to annex all the barbarian tribes we may conquer in

this war.

Mr. WILSON. The Senator states that the matter has been held up. Will

he be kind enough to say where?

Mr. WHITE. Certainly. I mean if the Administration desires to establish

a coaling station at Honolulu it would be easy to negotiate a treaty to do

so.

Mr. WILSON. It was held up in the United States Senate.

Mr. WHITE. It has been rather dormant here, very dormant, I agree with

the Senator. There is a very singular feature about the matter referred to,

called to my attention by the Senator from Washington, and it is this:

This treaty was not called up until the middle of January. Then it was

dropped, and now it is brought up at this time, and we are told that

conditions are so exigent that we must tack it on to a war measure. We

have certainly become remarkably anxious and excited about it.

Mr. WILSON. Interrupting the honorable Senator again I will say that

personally I am entirely in favor of the annexation of the Hawaiian

Islands.

Mr. WHITE. I regret to say that I know that.

Mr. WILSON. All my people are in favor of the annexation of the

Hawaiian Islands, but I do not think myself that it is advisable to tack it

on to this war measure. I want to see this bill passed as speedily as

possible. We are not going to change a single vote by prolonging this

discussion. We could vote on it to-morrow and pass the bill and give the

Government, that we continue to complain of every day for forcing the

war, money and men to carry it on. That is what we ought to do and

what the people of the United States hope we will do.

Mr. WHITE. And what the Committee on Finance is trying to do, as I

understand it.

Mr. WILSON. I am trying to aid the committee as far as my one vote

will go in that direction.

Mr. WHITE. Another thing. When we are told that it is necessary to

legislate regarding the various acquisitions that we are to make, I think

we are told that we are opening a question involving this entire

international subject and which is entirely outside of the scope of the

revenue measure before the Senate. I hope that we will go on and

consider the revenue bill and dispose of it and dispose of the other urgent

matters that are before us and await the result of the conflict now going

on, and settle upon some policy consistent with the occasion and which

patriotism and duty to our country require us to determine wisely.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Shall the discussion which

is being carried on by the junior Senator from Massachusetts be

proceeded with behind closed doors? [Putting the question.] The ayes

appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the Senator from Massachusetts

will proceed.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, if I had been permitted to continue I could

have finished in ten minutes. I have really made the argument which I

desire to make. If it had not been that it would have precipitated a

protracted debate, I should have argued then what has been argued ably

since we came into secret legislative session, that at this moment the

Administration was compelled to violate the neutrality of those islands,

that protests from foreign representatives had already been received, and

complications with other powers were threatened, that the annexation or

some action in regard to those islands had become a military necessity.

Mr. MORGAN. May I ask the Senator how he acquired the knowledge

of the fact that protests of foreign governments have been interposed?

Mr. LODGE. I was so informed.

Mr. WHITE. I should like to know by what governments.

Mr. LODGE. I was advised on what I regard as good authority. I was

not shown the papers. I was told that we were threatened with foreign

complications and that protests had been received from the German and

French consuls. So I was informed.

Mr. GEAR. Has Hawaii declared neutrality yet?

Mr. LODGE. That has absolutely nothing to do with it. She is bound to

be neutral whether she declares it or not.

Mr. WHITE. I simply desire to say that I think I have been quite directly

informed that nothing of that kind has been sent in by Germany.

Mr. LODGE. I may be mistaken. I thought my authority was good.

At all events it was that view that I should have used the Hawaiian

Islands as an illustration of the argument I desired to make, which I did

make, that I thought Congress should not to be in a hurry to adjourn until

all measures for the prosecution of the war were disposed of. I should

have continued only about five minutes longer. I have no intention of

delaying this bill either by amendment or argument, as I stated in the

beginning. I have said all I really desired to say, and I have nothing

further to add. I move, if agreeable to the Senate, that we go into open

legislative session.

Mr. HOAR. I think the Senate should rescind or reconsider the vote just

passed without division.

Mr. ALDRICH. No, that was the rule. We can now return to open

legislative session and go on with the bill.

Mr. HOAR. I am not quite sure of that. I should like to ask the Chair to

state the parliamentary position.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will state that the question

before the Senate, if the Senate should go into open legislative session, is

the amendment submitted by the Senator from Minnesota [Mr.

NELSON] to the amendment of the Senator from Maryland [Mr.

GORMAN] to the bill.

Mr. HOAR. What has the Senate voted?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate has voted that the discussion

which the Senator from Mass. [Mr. LODGE] was participating in, which

was a mere speech, should be continued behind closed doors.

Mr. HOAR. Was not the revenue bill up?

Mr. LODGE. It was.

Mr. HOAR. As I understand the parliamentary position, the revenue bill

was before the Senate, and my colleague proposed to discuss it. In the

course of that discussion he alluded to a certain topic. Thereupon, one

Senator moved and another joined with him in insisting that the

discussion should proceed with closed doors. Now, that settles the

question upon the pending bill. The Senate does not take notice of

particular arguments on particular topics. The Senate has voted that the

discussion on the revenue bill should proceed with closed doors, and if

we go back to open legislative session we go back not at liberty to take

up that subject, but only to proceed to other matters in open session.

Mr. COCKRELL. Oh, no.

Mr. HOAR. Now, in order to get rid of that we must rescind it. My

colleague states that he does not propose to continue his speech or to

continue further the discussion of that particular topic. If any other

Senator should propose to do that, the suggestion would be made here—

Mr. GRAY. Do we not rescind it when we vote to open the doors?

Mr. HOAR. No, that does not rescind it; that goes back to other

legislative business.

Mr. ALDRICH. No such motion as has been suggested by the Senator

from Mass. was adopted by the Senate.

Mr. HOAR. It is not a motion. It is a suggestion simply.

Mr. ALDRICH. No such motion has been adopted by the Senate.

Mr. HOAR. Yes it has.

Mr. ALDRICH. I beg the Senator’s pardon.

Mr. HOAR. What was the motion just passed within five minutes?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will state, if given permission,

that he put the question to the Senate shall the discussion which was

being carried on by the Senator from Mass. [Mr. LODGE] be proceeded

with behind closed doors.

Mr. ALDRICH. That is, the speech of the Senator from Mass., and it has

nothing to do with the revenue bill.

Mr. HOAR. There is nothing in the rule of the Senate which makes it in

order to vote that a particular speech shall go on behind closed doors. It

is the pending business which that vote related to.

Mr. SPOONER. If the Senator will pardon me a moment, the Senator’s

colleague had introduced as an amendment to the revenue bill what were

resolutions proposing to annex Hawaii.

Mr. HOAR. Certainly, to the revenue bill pending.

Mr. SPOONER. And he was proceeding it was thought to discuss that

proposition, and it was that proposition—

Mr. TILLMAN. The amendment of the Senator from Mass. [Mr.

LODGE] was not up particularly for discussion.

Mr. LODGE. The amendment was not up, and I did not have it read.

Mr. SPOONER. What was up?

Mr. HOAR. The revenue bill.

Mr. GRAY. The Senator was up.

Mr. LODGE. I was up.

Mr. HOAR. It is not very important, if Senators think otherwise, that the

business shall go on correctly, except as a matter of precedent. There is

no such thing as a vote in the Senate that a particular speech shall go on

behind closed doors. The vote relates to the ordinary question to which

the particular speech relates, and it has been voted that the revenue bill,

which was the pending subject, shall go on and proceed behind closed

doors. That vote should be the mere going back into open session. It

allows us to go back only for other business and not for that.

Mr. CHANDLER. I ask that the rule may be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will cause Rule 35 to be read

from the desk.

The SECRETARY read as follows:

Session with Close Doors. On a motion made and seconded to close the

doors of the Senate, on the discussion of any business which may, in the

opinion of a Senator, require secrecy, the Presiding Officer shall direct

the galleries to be cleared; and during the discussion of such motion the

doors shall remain closed.

Mr. HOAR. That is the business now, the business was the revenue bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is very clearly of the opinion

that if the Senate votes to proceed to the consideration of business in

open session, it is entirely competent to do so, and it vacates the former

motion. The motion is made that the Senate proceed to the consideration

of the revenue bill in open session.

The motion was agreed to, and at 4 o’clock and 45 minutes from, after 2

hours and 53 minutes spent with closed doors, the doors were reopened.

November 28: Lā Kūʻokoʻa – Hawaiʻi’s Independence Day

On November 28th, 1843, three envoys from the Hawaiian Kingdom, Timoteo Haʻalilio, William Richards and Sir George Simpson obtained written recognition of Hawaiʻi’s sovereignty from the United Kingdom and France. The date became a national Hawaiian holiday beginning in 1844. I told this story on this occasion last year, so this year I wanted to give a more personal account of the voyage that led to this recognition. Haʻalilio was a Lahainaluna graduate born on Oʻahu of aliʻi rank and the son of Haʻaloʻu, the governor of Molokaʻi. Richards was a former missionary who left the mission to become teacher of political economy to the chiefs. Simpson was the former governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company in Canada. The three envoys split up, Simpson traveling West through Siberia to Europe and Haʻalilio and Richards traveling East through Mexico before sailing up the Atlantic coast.

Richards kept a journal that gives stirring accounts of their travels. In the Mexican desert, the two men experienced scorching heat during the day, and bitter cold at night, and rode part of the way on mules. The reason for the ignominious nature of their journey, was that it was kept secret so as not to upset diplomatic relations. The pair reached Washington and secured verbal recognition from President John Tyler, who promised to bring the issue up with Congress and work toward a written recognition.

Simpson, meanwhile, travelled first to Belgium, where its King Leopold had just received recognition 11 years earlier. Leopold was related to both King Louis-Phillpe of France and Queen Victoria, and could put in a good word for the fledgling new state on the international scene. Simpson then met Haʻalilio and Richards to pursue recognition from Britain and France. In the meantime, Haʻalilio was experiencing the kind of discrimination that Alexander Liholiho would later in the US with Gerrit Judd. In one letter, Richards tells of Haʻalilio being refused entry to a dining room, and having to eat with the servants. Richardsʻs protests that this was the Hawaiian ambassador fell on deaf ears, and Richards joined Haʻalilio in the servants’ dining area.

In Hawaiʻi, the Paulet Affair, an overthrow by Britain had occurred in February, but was reversed in July. So Hawaiʻi’s sovereignty on the international level was being challenged just as it was being recognized. It took a few months to get a joint proclamation from Britain and France, but that was made on November 28th, signed by Lord Aberdeen on behalf of Queen Victoria. With their successful mission behind them and the sovereignty of Hawaiʻi secure, Haʻalilio and Richards returned to Hawaiʻi. But the trip had taken a toll on Haʻalilio. Richards’s journal has daily entries on his health, with good days and bad days, and one can feel the affection Richards had for his traveling companion, upon whom Hawaiʻi’s sovereignty literally depended. On December 3rd, 1844, Haʻalilio died of tuberculosis on board the returning ship at the age of 36. Kupuna Mel Kalahiki, one of those who revived the observance of Lā Kūʻokoʻa (along with Kekuni Blaisdell), described Haʻalilio as “one of the unsung heroes that you don’t often hear about.”

The Overthrow

One hundred and nineteen years ago, the Hawaiian Kingdom was overthrown. Queen Lili‘uokalani began her reign on Jan 29. 1891. Concerns at the start of her reign included the Bayonet Constitution, internal political struggles and the McKinley Tariff. When Lili‘uokalani ascended the throne, she was forced to pledge an oath of allegiance to the Bayonet Constitution. This meant that the monarch was unable to accomplish any act without the cabinet’s or the legislature’s approval. The monarch’s greatest power was the ability to appoint cabinet members.

Queen Lili’uokalani

But internal political dissention made it difficult for Lili‘uokalani to select and keep an ideal cabinet. As the queen put it in her 1897 book Hawaiiʻs Story, “The legislature, instead of creating legislation to benefit the people, spent its time in the making and unmaking of cabinets.” The parties involved included the Reform Party, the National Reform Party, and the Liberal Party

The Reform party was also known as the downtown party, or the missionary party. It consisted of sugar businessmen. A key figure was Lorrin Thurston, whose agenda was to maintain control of the government and achieve annexation to the US.

The key figure in the National reform party was the new Queen, Lydia Kamaka‘eha Lili‘uokalani. Her agenda was to maintain Hawaiian independence, change the constitution, and to govern via careful and irreproachable means, so as not to provide the foreign presence in Hawai‘i any justification for calling for assistance from their home countries, which could lead to an overthrow.

Finally, the Liberal party’s key figure was Robert Kalanihiapo Wilcox, one of the young Hawaiians educated in Italy under the guardianship of Celso Cesar Moreno. His agenda was to maintain Hawaiian independence by not acknowledging the validity of the Bayonet Constitution. Further, he planned to take back control of government through more “liberal” means. This group, which included anti-annexation activist Joseph Nawahï, eventually advocated a Native Hawaiian-controlled republic.

The queen consulted with the anti-annexation political party Hui Kalaʻāina to ask the members of the group to draft a new constitution.  Lili’uokalani told the group to hold on to the document until further notice.  After Lili’uokalaniʻs alliance between the Reform Party and Wilcox’s Liberal Party, she decided it was time for a new cabinet.  The Queen wanted to restore some measure of native rule that was lost in the Bayonet Constitution.

US Marines in Hawai’i, January 1893

As Queen Lili‘uokalani was about to promulgate a new constitution (to replace the “Bayonet Constitution” forced on her brother King Kalakaua in 1887, which gave foreigners the right to vote), non-Hawaiian business leaders, most connected with the sugar industry, overthrew the Queen with the aid of US Marines. On January 16^th, 1893, the day that Queen Lili‘u was to instate a new constitution, John L. Stevens had the sailors and marines of the USS Boston land at Honolulu harbor and take up quarters in the yard of Arion Hall, in direct view of ʻIolani palace. The Marines acted at the request of Stevens, US Minister to the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, but without the knowledge or authorization of Congress or the President.

Lorrin Thurston

The next day, January 17^th 1893, the conspirators read a proclamation declaring that the “Hawaiian monarchical system of government is hereby abrogated,” at the back door of Aliʻiolani Hale, the government building. Henry Cooper read this proclamation to “no one in particular” according to Tom Coffman– there was no crowd present to hear the proclamation. The oligarchy proclaimed itself a provisional government, elected Sanford B. Dole President, and Stevens immediately recognized this government as the “de facto government of the Hawaiian Islands.” De facto  means “in fact” as opposed to de jure, meaning “in law.”

Lili’uokalani’s statement read:

I, Liliʻuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional government of the Hawaiian kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional government of and for this kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose Minister Plenipotentiary, his Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu, and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now to avoid and collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss f life, I do, under this protest and impelled by the said forces yield my authority until such time as the government of the United States shall, upon the facts presented to it, undo the acts of its representative, and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.

Liliʻuokalani yielded, as Kamehameha III had fifty years earlier, under protest to “the superior force of the United States of America, until such time as the Government of the United States should undo the action of its representatives.” The provisional government then proceeded to lobby the US Congress to annex Hawaii. Their aim was to become a territory, thereby avoiding foreign tariffs on sugar. In March 1893 Grover Cleveland replaced Harrison as President, and withdrew the treaty of annexation from the Senate.

President Cleveland opposed the annexation of Hawai‘i and the overthrow. Cleveland sent Senator James Blount to investigate the events of 1893. Blount was flooded with testimonies from numerous parties; the largest majority of whom were Hawaiians.

The Provisional Government wined and dined Blount, because he was the one who could justify their actions. Blount did not meet a single annexationist willing to put the question of annexation to a vote of the people. After collecting weeks of testimony from both sides of the issue, Blount produced one of the most scathing critiques of US foreign policy in American history. Blount’s 1400-page document recommended that the Provisional Government step down, and that Lili‘uokalani be restored to her rightful position as the monarch of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

On the basis of this report Cleveland pushed for reinstatement of Queen Lili‘uokalani. In his address to Congress, Cleveland stated: “In an act of war a friendly and confiding people has been overthrown, a substantial wrong has thus been done which we should endeavor to repair.” Congress, however, was mainly pro-annexation, and this led to a standoff for the next five years between Congress and the President over the issue of annexing Hawai’i. The Blount report was excerpted in newspapers across the United States, striking up a national debate over imperialism. Cleveland’s message to Congress strongly advised restoring the throne and government to Lili’uokalani.

Meanwhile passage of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff in 1894 repealed the McKinley Tariff, and replaced Hawai‘i sugar growers in the privileged competitive position with regard to US sugar sales.In Cleveland’s message to Congress he stated: “By an act of war, the government of a friendly and confiding people has thus been overthrown. A substantial wrong has been done that we should endeavor to repair.” President Cleveland was accused by some of restoring monarchy and “stamping out republicanism,” an ironic move for an American President. Others in the US supported Cleveland’s position.

In response to Clevelandʻs recommendation to Congress, however, the Provisional Government, on July 4, 1894, declared itself to be the Republic of Hawaii, claiming that the US had no right to interfere in its domestic affairs. According to Noenoe Silva, the Republic of Hawai’i was created in 1894 by “about 4000 men, most of foreign birth, [who] signed the oath and voted in the election.” Hawaiians protested to the US and other countries over this process, claiming that “confident in the honesty and impartiality of America, [had] patiently and peacefully submitted to the insults and tyranny of the Provisional Government.”

When the Republic of Hawai’i planned to proclaim itself on July 4, 1894 – a date meant to signify a transition from monarchy to republican government – Hawaiians were “outraged” (Silva, 2004, 137). On July 2, between 5000 and 7000 people rallied at Palace square to protest the formation of the Republic. This rally was never reported in any of the standard history books. In January 1895, Robert Wilcox planned a second “counter-revolution,” this time against the Republic of Hawaii. The plan was discovered, and the counter-revolutionaries were chased through the mountains behind Honolulu. A soldier on each side was killed. Two hundred were captured and tried for treason against the Republic.

Capitano Robert Wilcox

Some of the captured counter-revolutionaries were sentenced to death. These death sentences were used as a threat by the Republic to persuade Liliʻuokalani to abdicate, or surrender, her position as queen (as opposed to head of state). US officials sent a message to the Republic that no executions should occur, but the Republic allowed Liliʻuokalani to continue to believe that the executions would still be carried out, and under this impression she abdicated her throne. Lili’uokalani was arrested for “misprision of treason” – an antiquated, or out-of-date charge that meant knowledge of treason. She was imprisoned in ʻIolani palace for eight months. She was pardoned in 1896, and immediately traveled to the US to lobby against the annexation treaty. In Washington, Lili‘uokalani lodged a formal protest with the US State Department.

The Provisional Government declared itself an American protectorate after eight days.  According to a statement of Hawaiian Patriotic League: “But eight days had not elapsed before the loyalty, fidelity and patriotism of the incongruous, discordant crowd, who supported the provisional government manifested itself by dissensions running riot, to such a point that the only manner of saving the new order was to implore Mr. Stevens for a declaration of American protectorate.”

The United States sent out diplomatic statements, which, as historian Ralph Kuykendall notes, notified other countries that the US considered Hawai‘I as in its sphere of influence, and that “it would patrol the orchard.” Five years after the overthrow, with a new president in office, the US again attempted annexation, but in a way that was doubly illegal, and as I will argue in a future column, very unlikely.

President William McKinley